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Abstract
Daqi Dong. Ph.D The University of Memphis. August/2016. Action Execution, Its
Estimation and Learning for a Systems Level Cognitive Architecture. Major Professor: Stanley
P. Franklin.
An agent or robot achieves its goals by interacting with its environment, cyclically
choosing and executing suitable actions. Cognitive architectures are considered the control
structures of the agent, helping it decide what to do next, while the designs resemble how minds
work, be they human, animal, or artificial.
An action execution process is a critical part of an entire cognitive architecture, because
the process of generating executable motor commands is not only driven by low-level
environmental information, but is also initiated and affected by the agent‘s high-level mental
processes. I give a review of the cognitive models of the action execution process as
implemented in a set of popular cognitive architectures, and conclude with some general
observations regarding the nature of action execution.
Next, I present a cognitive model—the Sensory Motor System (SMS)—for an action
execution process, as a new module of the LIDA (for ―Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent‖)
systems-level cognitive model. A sensorimotor system derived from the subsumption
architecture has been implemented into the SMS; and several cognitive neuroscience hypotheses
have been incorporated as well.
Inspired by the hypothesis that humans estimate their movements based on their
knowledge of the dynamics of the environment, and on actual sensory data (Wolpert,
Ghahramani, & Jordan, 1995), I create a model of the estimation process of action execution
using SMS in LIDA. Also, based on a recent study in neuroscience (Herzfeld, Vaswani, Marko,
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& Shadmehr, 2014), I introduce a new factor—memory of errors—into this model of estimation.
The historical errors help humans determine the stability of the environment, so as to decide the
degree to which knowledge of the environment may affect the estimation.
Learning is significant for for allowing an agent to act more intelligently. I present a new
model of sensorimotor learning in LIDA, one that helps an agent properly interact with its
environment using past experiences. Following Global Workspace Theory, the primary basis of
LIDA, this learning is cued by the agent‘s conscious content, the most salient portion of the
agent‘s understanding of the current situation. Furthermore, I add a dynamic learning rate to
control the extent to which newly arriving conscious content may affect the learning.
Finally, I introduce an extension of the SMS. This extension allows, and explains, the use
of the sensory data, the prime, perceived before a participant starts his or her movement, by the
SMS during action execution. Furthermore, this extension allows the replication by a LIDAbased agent, of some human experiments (T. Schmidt, 2002) studying the priming process in
motor control.
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1. Introduction
Humans seem very curious about their bodies, their minds, and especially their
intelligence. In the field of artificial intelligence (AI), the original aim was to reproduce humanlevel intelligence. In robotics, people would like to create human-like robots. In addition to the
hardware bodies, a robot does need a controller determining what to do next. A human-level
controller allows the robot to be human-like.
I consider the robot that owns both the body and the controller to be an agent.
Furthermore, I require the agent to be autonomous. An autonomous agent acts independently in
its environment with an agenda, and over time its actions may affect what it senses in the future
(Franklin & Graesser, 1997). A general question motivating my research activities is ―how do
minds work, be they human, animal, or artificial?‖ Following the LIDA Model, I define a mind
as a control structure for an autonomous agent (Franklin, Madl, D‘Mello, & Snaider, 2014). In
my work, cognitive architectures are used as a concrete tool to explore cognitive representations
and processes of minds, from the perspective of computer science, the data structures and
algorithms of control structures.
Action and action execution
Action plays an essential role in creating a human-like agent: The agent interacts with its
environment by acting to achieve its goals. But how does that an action happen? For example,
when I am doing my daily driving, I know I am driving but I do not know exactly what I am
doing at every moment. How about the force applied by my fingers to the steering wheel, the
oxygen-level in my blood, or my mental states? I am not aware of much of that either during the
driving or afterwards. I only remember some ―screen shots‖ of the driving after I have arrived. It
is interesting to see that humans do not know much about how their actions have been done, in
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the cases of driving, swimming, or even gripping a cup, while they do know that they can do
these things and, at a relatively abstract level, what they are doing.
From different fields of study such as psychology, neuroscience, and cognitive science,
researchers have provided evidence and formulated hypotheses to explain how human action
works. Marc Jeannerod, citing the work of Searle (1983), built upon the concept that covert
action representation is followed by overt, real execution of action. In detail, ―…the conceptual
content, when it exists (i.e., when an explicit desire to perform the action is formed), is present
first. Then, at the time of execution, a different mechanism comes into play where the
representation loses its explicit character and runs automatically to reach the desired goal‖
(Jeannerod, 2006, pp. 4-5). Jeannerod suggests that action representation (preparation) and action
execution are two different processes. A similar idea of distinguishing action execution from
action preparation (selection) is proposed by Milner and Goodale as well. In their work on the
two visual systems (1992; 2008), they proposed two cortical systems, the ventral and dorsal
streams, providing ―vision for perception‖ and ―vision for action‖ respectively. Regarding the
roles of the two streams in the guidance of action, the perceptual mechanism in the ventral
stream identifies a goal object, and helps to select an appropriate course of action, while the
dorsal stream ―is critical for the detailed specification and online control of the constituent
movements that form the action‖ (Milner & Goodale, 2008, p. 775). Additional studies regarding
human action, especially certain neuroscientific evidence, can be found in a set of review papers
(Castiello, 2005; Grafton, 2010; Wolpert, Diedrichsen, & Flanagan, 2011).
Dr. Stan Franklin and I have proposed as well that human action presents two aspects:
―what to do‖ and ―how to do it‖ (2014b). On the one hand, action is driven by the agent‘s
intention. This means the agent selects the action via internal motivation as a result of mental
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processes, rather than generating a simple reflex in response to a stimulus. Thus, the agent
understands what it will do before the action execution begins. However, this understanding of
the action is not executable in the real world, because the needed low-level environmental
information is not yet involved; executing an action in the real world requires us to conceive of
an agent‘s action as occurring within its environment (Franklin & Graesser, 1997). On the other
hand, the action‘s execution may not be understandable to the agent, because the environmental
elements involved are low-level raw data without explicit meaning, while that which is
understandable must have some form of meaning for the agent. As an example, the agent does
not directly understand the raw stimulus data retrieved by its sensors from the environment.
Rather, the data must be transformed into higher level meaning by a perception process; that is,
the transformation produces an understandable representation of the sensed data. Action
execution performs a transformation similar to that of perception, but in reverse: converts an
understandable action into low-level movements.
We have further proposed and computationally implemented a new model, the Sensory
Motor System (SMS), for how a human maintains one facet of action: ―how to do it‖ (Dong &
Franklin, 2015b). The SMS is a cognitive model of the action execution process. Action
execution refers to a situation in which an agent executes a selected goal-directed action in the
real world so as to produce pertinent movement. The SMS transforms the selected action into an
executable low-level action sequence, a sequence of motor commands, and executes them
through appropriate use of the agent‘s actuators in the environment. This transformation is
assisted by the sensory data perceived online.
One important data structure used in the SMS is the motor plan. A set of motor
commands is prepared inside a motor plan, and the plan generates motor commands in an order
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driven by the arrival of sensory data. Our motor plan is implemented based on the subsumption
architecture (Brooks, 1986, 1991), which behaves like a reactive structure that passively
produces output upon the arrival of input. The subsumption architecture fulfills the required
features of action execution as we model it, including (1) the bottom-up sensory data directly
driving the executable action, (2) the decomposition from an understandable action to executable
motor commands, and (3) the absence of an understandable action‘s ―explicit character‖ as
mentioned by Jeannerod above. But on the other hand, the subsumption architecture does not
reflect the process of specification for the movement parameters nor does it interact with highlevel goal-directed actions. We have implemented these in our SMS, an important extension of
the subsumption architecture. I introduce the details of the subsumption architecture, its
extension, and the fundamental concepts of the SMS in Chapter 4.
Action execution for cognitive architectures
For the last several decades, due to the difficulty of achieving human level intelligence,
the majority of AI researchers have focused on what has been called ―narrow AI‖, where the AI
system is highly constrained to specific tasks. But recently, a movement in AI research called
artificial general intelligence (AGI) has been initiated (Goertzel & Pennachin, 2007; Wang,
Goertzel, & Franklin, 2008). It aims to return to the original goal of AI, to construct computer
systems with human-like general intelligence. AGI research treats intelligence as a whole; it
carries out the engineering practice according to an outline of a system comparable to the human
mind in a certain sense. A parallel movement appeared a little later under the rubric of BICA
(Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures) as well. BICA focuses on the integration of
various research efforts from different disciplines to address the challenge of creating a
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computational equivalent of the human mind. Both AGI and BICA address their AI dreams by
approaching things at a systems level, and proceeding to model the human mind.
Actually, the use of systems level cognitive architectures has been championed by several
researchers in the past as well. Artificial intelligence pioneer Allen Newell strongly supported
the need for systems-level theories and architectures, claiming that ―You can‘t play 20 questions
with nature and win‖ (1973). Langley, Laird, and Rogers (2009) argued as follows: ―Instead of
carrying out micro-studies that address only one issue at a time, we should attempt to unify many
findings into a single theoretical framework, then proceed to test and refine that theory.‖ They
are calling for a broad-based, systems-level architecture.
Cognitive architectures are designed to be the basis for creating autonomous agents that
can solve a wide variety of problems using a wide range of knowledge; they define and organize
―the primitive computational structures that store, retrieve, and process knowledge‖ to pursue the
agent‘s goals (J. Laird, 2012). A collection of cognitive architectures has been reviewed in recent
studies (Duch, Oentaryo, & Pasquier, 2008; Goertzel et al., 2010; P Langley et al., 2009).
Regarding actions and their execution processes, a brief summary has been made in the
following lines:
A cognitive architecture must also be able to execute skills and actions in
the environment. In some frameworks, this happens in a completely
reactive manner, with the agent selecting one or more primitive actions on
each decision cycle, executing them, and repeating the process on the next
cycle. This approach is associated with closed-loop strategies for
execution, since the agent can also sense the environment on each time
step. The utilization of more complex skills supports open-loop execution,
in which the agent calls upon a stored procedure across many cycles
without checking the environment. However, a flexible architecture should
support the entire continuum from fully reactive, closed-loop behavior to
automatized, open-loop behavior, as can humans. (P Langley et al., 2009)
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I give a review regarding the action execution process implemented in different cognitive
architectures in Chapter 3.
In our work, not only do we model action execution itself, we have also addressed the
relationship between action execution and other cognitive processes. We have developed the
Sensory Motor System (SMS) as a new module for a systems level cognitive architecture,
LIDA1. LIDA is a conceptual, systems level model of human mental processes. It had integrated
perception, attention, and action (selection) previously (Franklin et al., 2014), and now we have
added the SMS to fulfill its action execution part (Dong & Franklin, 2015b). In the current
LIDA, its Sensory Memory provides sensory data to drive the process of action execution
implemented by the SMS, while LIDA‘s Action Selection module provides the selected goaldirected action (the selected behavior in LIDA) to the SMS to execute. I describe the details of
LIDA in Chapter 2.
Furthermore, we have implemented estimation and learning of action execution in LIDA
(Dong & Franklin, 2015a; Dong, Franklin, & Agrawal, 2015).
Humans estimate their movements based on both their knowledge of the dynamics of the
environment and actual sensory data (Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; Wolpert et al., 1995).
Wolpert and colleagues have incorporated this understanding into a model that simulates this
estimation using the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960). Inspired by their work, we have modeled the
estimation process embedded within action execution in LIDA (Dong et al., 2015). An internal
model has been added into the SMS and the Kalman Filter has been extended using the idea of
memory of errors (Herzfeld et al., 2014) for estimating action effects. I introduce this estimation
work in Chapter 5.

1

For historical reasons LIDA stands for Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent.
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In LIDA, by the competitive process specified in Global Workspace Theory (Baars,
1988, 2002), a LIDA-based agent decides what portion of the perceived present situation should
be attended to and broadcast to the rest of the system to modulate learning (Franklin et al., 2014).
Particularly, this attended present situation, called the current conscious content, is broadcast to
the SMS to assist its sensory motor learning (Dong & Franklin, 2015a). I introduce learning in
SMS in Chapter 6.
We have created different LIDA-based agents using different software robots, such as
youBot and a two-wheel robot, to implement our SMS. A software environment, Webots, is used
in our experiments as well. These computational implementations and experiments have
previously verified and improved the capabilities of the models we have created herein. I review
them in Chapter 4.
Finally, we have tested the LIDA Model to explain and predict an unconscious priming
effect on motor control as reported from a human experiment (T. Schmidt, 2002). The model
failed in both the explanation and the prediction before our improvement. Therefore, we
improved (refined) the LIDA Model by extending its Sensory Motor System (SMS) so as to
model, and thereby explain the empirical data. A software agent was created using this improved
model, which allowed the replication of the empirical data concerning motor priming. I introduce
our design of the extended SMS and the relevant computational simulations in Chapter 7.
Contributions of this work
An agent achieves its goals by interacting with its environment, cyclically choosing and
executing suitable actions. An action execution process is a reasonable and critical part of an
entire cognitive architecture, because the process of generating executable motor commands is
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not only driven by low-level environmental information, but is also initiated and affected by the
agent‘s high-level mental processes.
Many cognitive architectures exist, though none, as yet, at human-level intelligence
(Samsonovich, 2010). Especially, not very many cognitive architectures consider action
execution a standard component: In an online Comparative Table of Implemented Cognitive
Architectures2, from more than two dozen posted architectures, we find that less than half of
them have implemented action execution in a relatively complete form (Dong & Franklin,
2014a).
Even of those cognitive architectures in which action execution has been implemented,
none has fully addressed the features of action execution discussed above. For example, in the
Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) architecture (ACT-R 6.0 Tutorial, 2012), ―there
is typically no direct communication between the perceptual and motor modules.3 The data
passed to the motor module always comes from the high-level declarative memory.‖ (Dong &
Franklin, 2015b). And in Soar (J. Laird, 2008, 2012), although it uses the term ―motor
commands‖ to describe its final output data, these commands cannot be directly executed in the
external world. Soar only transforms selected high-level actions into general low-level actions,
and an external program is always necessary to handle their final ―real‖ execution. I give a
detailed discussion regarding action execution implemented in different cognitive architectures
in Chapter 3.
In our work, we have designed the Sensory Motor System (SMS) as a sub module of the
systems level cognitive model LIDA, thereby rendering it capable of communicating with other
cognitive modules naturally in a closed cognitive loop, from sensors to actions. The design of
2

It is available at http://bicasociety.org/cogarch/
There is only very limited direct connectivity between perceptual and motor modules. Spatial
information in particular is communicated directly.
3
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LIDA is biologically inspired, aiming to model human-level minds, and the SMS follows
LIDA‘s design philosophy, pursuing the model of human-level action execution. The features of
action execution introduced above have been well covered in our addition of the SMS into
LIDA. Furthermore, many new hypotheses and understandings regarding human minds and
action execution have been involved.
Here we provide a way to explore a specific cognitive module, action execution, and its
relationship with other relevant cognitive modules. This allows us to further explore how a mind
works, especially regarding its action execution part.
Specifically in the design of SMS, we have considered the subsumption architecture from
a new viewpoint, namely, that its capabilities fulfill the hypothesis regarding the online control
role of the dorsal stream. Also, we have modified the original subsumption architecture as
inspired by certain hypotheses from cognitive neuroscience so as to combine a reactive structure
with a goal-directed action.
We have modeled two distinct cognitive processes occurring in action execution,
estimation and learning. This makes the SMS behave in a manner closer to human-level action
execution. Also, the concept of memory of errors has been borrowed from recent studies in
neuroscience (Herzfeld et al., 2014) and applied into our models to improve their similarities to
certain human behaviors and their computational performance. I give full descriptions of the
estimation, learning, and memory of errors in Chapters 5 and 6.
We have published our work in peer-viewed journals. Some of the papers are
incorporated in the literature review (Chapter 3) and the three Chapters (4-6) reporting results.4

4

In all publications, Dong proposed the original idea, wrote the draft of paper, designed the experiment,
developed the software, and analyzed the data. Ideas provided by Franklin and Agrawal were reflected
into the final version by Dong after the discussion with these co-authors. All publications were supervised
by Franklin.
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Also, we have submitted a new paper that is incorporated in Chapter 7.5 I list these papers and
their summarized contributions just below, presented as a summary of my research contributions
to Computer Science and Cognitive Modeling:


Chapter 3: Dong, D., & Franklin, S. (2014). The Action Execution Process

Implemented in Different Cognitive Architectures: A Review. Journal of Artificial General
Intelligence, 5(1), 47-66.
Contributions: (1) A review of the action execution process as implemented in different
cognitive architectures. The common characteristics of action execution were identified, and its
comprehensive representations and functional procedures were summarized.



Chapter 4: Dong, D., & Franklin, S. (2015). A New Action Execution Module for

the Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent (LIDA): The Sensory Motor System. Cognitive
Computation, 7(5), 552-568.
Contributions: (2) The completion of a systems level cognitive architecture, LIDA, by
fulfilling its action execution part, particularly by newly designing and implementing the
Sensory Motor System (SMS). The design is both biologically inspired and computationally
implementable. (3) The subsumption architecture has been newly applied in cognitive modeling,
and has been extended with variables dynamically specifiable at runtime. (4) The execution of a
grip action has been implemented using a LIDA-based agent incorporating the SMS. A software
robot, youBot, and a simulated environment, Webots, were configured and involved as well. This
grip implementation allows experimental verifications of the models.
5

In this paper, Dong provided the design of the extended SMS, developed its software simulation, and
wrote the relevant sections. Agrawal prepared the experimental environments, replicated the human
experimental results using the extended SMS, and wrote the rest of the paper. All work was supervised by
Franklin.
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Chapter 5: Dong, D., Franklin, S., & Agrawal, P. (2015). Estimating Human

Movements Using Memory of Errors. Procedia Computer Science, 71, 1-10.
Contributions: (5) An internal model has been implemented in the SMS to produce an
estimation of the effect of action execution. The estimated result was determined by comparing it
with experimental results of humans. (6) The original implementation of the internal model
(Wolpert & Ghahramani, 2000; Wolpert et al., 1995) was novelly extended with the concept of
memory of errors (Herzfeld et al., 2014), resulting in improved similarity to humans in our
model.



Chapter 6: Dong, D., & Franklin, S. (2015). Modeling Sensorimotor Learning in

LIDA Using a Dynamic Learning Rate. Biologically Inspired Cognitive Architectures, 14, 1-9.
Contributions: (7) Sensory motor learning has been implemented in LIDA following
global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988, 2002). This is the second implementation of learning in
LIDA, the first being the modeling of attentional learning by Faghihi and colleagues (2012). (8)
A dynamic learning rate has been added into the reward updating process of the learning. We
have set up a software simulated experiment, where a LIDA-based agent looks for boxes and
pushes them around. Better execution of the push action has been obtained by using sensory
motor learning with the dynamic learning rate.


Chapter 7: Agrawal, P., Dong, D., & Franklin, S. (submitted in 2016). Modeling

Motor Priming in a Systems Level Cognitive architecture. Cognitive Science.
Contributions: (8) Empirical data concerning unconscious motor priming has been
explained by an extension to the LIDA Model. In particular, LIDA‘s Sensory Motor System
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(SMS) has been extended so as to model, and thereby explain the data. A software agent is
created based on the improved LIDA incorporating the extended SMS, which allowed the
replication of the empirical data concerning motor priming.
Structure of this work
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the context of
our work and the LIDA Model, especially its action part. Chapter 3 presents a review regarding a
set of cognitive architectures that have implemented the action execution process. The
fundamental concept of the Sensory Motor System (SMS) of LIDA, a model of action execution
for a systems level cognitive architecture, is introduced in Chapter 4. I introduce the models for
estimation and learning of action execution, using the SMS in LIDA, separately in Chapter 5 and
6. In Chapter 7, I describe the model of priming of action execution. Chapter 8 discusses the
conclusions, and outlines directions for future research.
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2. Background and Context
We are working on cognitive modeling of human mental processes and relevant
behaviors. This area of computer science also has interdisciplinary ramifications, including
implications for psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and others.
The simulation of real-world human behavior provides an opportunity to create robots
that mimic different classes of movement, as well as the relationship between human movement
and the physical world. Physics offers rich empirical studies regarding these motions. The
simulation of the human mind, modeling the various internal processes and representations of
human cognition, naturally directs us to the field of psychology. An emphasis on the modeling of
human action execution hybridizes two complementary perspectives. From one point of view,
humans execute actions using actuators that produce physical movement of body parts; from
another, the action is an output of human mental activities initiated internally. This leads us to
the field of cognitive neuroscience.
Our approaches resemble those of traditional computer science. We have certain
requirements to satisfy and specific computational problems to resolve; we design and
implement appropriate data structures and algorithms (architectures); we test our results from
different levels and viewpoints as when releasing a software product. However, distinctly, since
the similarity between the subjects of study and their simulations is an important criterion for the
evaluation of a model, we borrow hypotheses from other disciplines regarding system
requirements, as well as replicate the experiments of such studies using our cognitive models,
and compare simulated results to human data as a means of model verification.
Although we neither study nor experiment on humans directly, a cognitive model of the
human mind—more specifically, a computational implementation—provides many potential
supports for human activities such as education, health care, or entertainment. It is similar to
23

computational simulations of physical or social phenomena, for instance, meteorological,
cosmological or economic models.
The LIDA Model
The LIDA Model is a systems level cognitive model (Franklin et al., 2016). It
implements and fleshes out a number of psychological and neuropsychological theories, but is
primarily based on Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988, 2002). The model is grounded in the
LIDA cognitive cycle (see Figure 1). The simulated human mind can be viewed as functioning
via a continual, overlapping sequence of these cycles. Each cognitive cycle consists of three
phases: 1) the LIDA agent first senses the environment, recognizes objects, and builds its
understanding of the current situation; 2) by a competitive process, as specified by Global
Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988, 2002), it then decides what portion of the represented situation
should be attended to and broadcasted to the rest of the system; 3) finally, the broadcasted
portion of the situation supplies information allowing the agent to choose an appropriate action
to execute, and modulates learning.
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Figure 1 gives an intuitive feel for the relationship among different modules. These LIDA
modules are introduced below ordered according to the three phases of the LIDA cognitive
cycle: understanding, attention, and action/learning. I describe them in a linear way in order to
make the process more easily understood. But actually, each LIDA module acts independently
and asynchronously with other modules in LIDA. I introduce more about action execution part in
action/learning phase while the details of other modules can be found in (Franklin et al., 2016).
Understanding phase
The incoming stimuli are sensed by the agent‘s sensors from the external and internal
environment. Sensory Memory (SM) gets these sensory data (stimuli) and a set of low-level
features of the stimuli are made out of them. These low-level features are passed to Perceptual
Associative Memory (PAM) where higher-level features, such as objects, events, categories,
actions, feelings, etc. are recognized. These recognized entities make up the percept that passes
to the Workspace, where the agent‘s perceived current situation is updated in the Current
Situational Model (CSM). The percept serves as a cue to Spatial Memory, Transient Episodic
Memory, and Declarative Memory, to recall the remembered contents from these memory
systems that were associated with the elements of the cue.
Structure building codelets build high-level and more abstract understanding of the
current situation. These codelets are small, special purpose programs, each of which has some
particular type of structure it is designed to build. The Conscious Contents Queue stores a few
past conscious contents that helps the agent to update its understanding of current situation as
well.
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Attention phase
Attention Codelets are also special purpose programs that are concerned with certain
portions of the content maintained in CSM, and form them into coalitions. The codelets bring
these coalitions into the Global Workspace (GW) to compete to have the agent‘s attention. The
winner of the competition, the most salient coalition, has its content become the so-called
contents of the consciousness (Baars, 1988), to which the agent selectively attends in the current
cognitive cycle. The contents of consciousness issued by GW are broadcast to the rest of the
system.
Action/Learning phase
The broadcast conscious contents helps (1) agent decide what to do next and (2) for
modulating different modes of learning.
Procedural Memory stores schemes, the templates of possible actions including their
contexts and expected results (Drescher, 1991). It also stores an activation value that attempts to
measure, for each such scheme, the likelihood that an action taken within its context produces
the expected result. The schemes whose contexts and results match the broadcast conscious
content well are instantiated into behaviors, which are the instances of the templates with their
variables instantiated to the current situation.
These behaviors are passed to the Action Selection (Maes, 1989), where a single
behavior, the selected action in LIDA, is selected to execute.
Ideas concerning action execution have been briefly proposed in the LIDA Model,
mainly expressed by two modules: Sensory Motor Memory and Motor Plan Execution depicted
in the bottom left corner of Figure 1. However, the complete concept of action execution and its
computational implementation have not yet been specified. We work on this here.
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The original Sensory Motor Memory and Motor Plan Execution modules have been
implemented by the SMS in detail (See Chapter 4). Two of other LIDA modules, Action
Selection and Sensory Memory, provide relevant information—a selected behavior and the
sensory data through a dorsal stream channel1–as inputs to the SMS. The selected behavior is a
data structure resulting from the preceding Action Selection in the LIDA Model. It is comprised
of three components: a context, an action2, and a result. With some reliability, the result is
expected to occur when the action is taken in its context. The SMS sends out motor commands to
agent‘s actuators to generate its output in the environment.
Different types of learning are modeled in LIDA, in Figure 1 the learnings are illustrated
using the channel arrows starting from Global Workspace (GW) to different modules. The global
broadcast of the contents of the consciousness assists the learning. Particularly in our work, we
have implemented sensory motor learning, which is represented by the channel from GW to the
Sensory Motor Memory (See Chapter 6).

1

In LIDA, the dorsal stream channel directly passes sensory information, some interpretation of
sensory data, from the sensory memory to the action execution process.
2

In this context, the term ―action‖ refers to a component of a behavior. This differs from the general
usage, such as in the phrase ―action execution‖. In this document, we use ―action‖ in the general sense,
while ―action of a behavior‖ refers to a particular component of that behavior.
27

3. The Action Execution Process Implemented in Different Cognitive Architectures: A
Review
Introduction
This review focuses on cognitive models of action, or more specifically, of the action
execution process, as implemented in several popular cognitive architectures. We examine the
representations and procedures inside the action execution process, as well as the cooperation
between action execution and other high-level cognitive modules. We finally conclude with
some general observations regarding the nature of action execution. This work has been
published in 2014 (Dong & Franklin).
Cognitive architectures are designed to be the basis for creating general, autonomous
agents that can solve a wide variety of problems using a wide range of knowledge; they define
and organize ―the primitive computational structures that store, retrieve, and process knowledge‖
to pursue the agent‘s goals (J. Laird, 2012). Here we examine such cognitive models of actions,
and especially of the action execution process as it is implemented in different cognitive
architectures. The emphasis is placed on three questions: 1) What are the comprehensive
representations and functional procedures of action execution? 2) How do action
preparation/selection and action execution cooperate? and 3) What kind of specific designs are
useful for generating actions that both achieve the agent‘s goals and execute appropriately using
actuators in the environment?
The cognitive model of action in different cognitive architectures might be implemented
variously because of the model‘s tasks. For example, an action implemented in a simulated chess
match could be an abstract move, such as moving a piece one square to the left, or the low-level
actions implemented in a simulated tennis match which are necessary for controlling the player‘s
muscles (actuators) during the game. A chess action is driven only by the agent‘s internal goal; it
28

is not affected by the environmental situation—except the abstract representation of the position
of the pieces—nor does it require the maintenance of specifications for its actuators. On the other
hand, actions in tennis are generated on the basis of both the player‘s internal goals as well as the
present environmental situation. Tennis, unlike chess, requires an action execution process that
enables the agent to act in an uncertain and dynamic environment1. The action execution process
is the focus of this review.
Even for the cognitive architectures in which action execution has been considered, the
architecture may or may not completely implement it as a standard component. Some
architectures implement a complete action execution process, such as ACT-R (J. Anderson,
2007) and LIDA (Franklin et al., 2014); other architectures only transform prepared/selected
high-level actions into general low-level actions, and leave the action execution process to a
domain-dependent external program, such as Soar (J. Laird, 2012). We review both types of
architectures‘ action execution models below.
The next section describes a set of popular cognitive architectures with models for action
execution. For each of these architectures, we first give a brief introduction and overview of the
architecture‘s major components and functions; then we examine its specific implementation of
action execution; specifically, we may compare its action execution part to that of LIDA. The
following section concludes with a comparative summary of the action execution processes
reviewed herein.

1

A task environment is uncertain if 1) the agent sensors do not detect all aspects that are relevant to the
choice of action, or 2) the next state is unable to be determined by the current state and the executed
action; and the environment is dynamic if it can change while an agent is deliberating (Russell & Norvig,
2009).
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Action Execution Processes of Cognitive Architectures
In this section, we review the action execution processes of different cognitive
architectures in the ensuing subsections. In each of the subsections, after an introduction to the
architecture, we examine the representations and procedures inside the action execution process,
as well as the cooperation between action execution and other high-level cognitive modules.
4D/RCS
The review content of 4D/RCS mentioned here is mainly in response to a paper by Albus
and Barbera (2005). We cite the paper for this whole subsection, unless other explicit citations or
quotations are mentioned.
Real-time Control System (RCS) is a cognitive architecture designed to enable multiple
levels of intelligent behaviors, achieved by a multi-layered hierarchy of sensory-interactive
intelligent control process nodes. The most recent version, 4D/RCS, embeds the 4-D approach
(Dickmanns, 1992, 2000), a machine vision technology, within the RCS control architecture.
Each node in the architecture contains sensory processing (SP), world modeling (WM),
value judgment (VJ), behavior generation (BG), and a knowledge database (KD) (Albus &
Barbera, 2005). A SP process receives input from sensors; SP and WM processes cooperate to
filter, attribute, and classify the input data as a perception process; WM processes create and
update the recognized states of the world in the KD; a BG process accepts tasks and plans, and
executes behaviors to accomplish those tasks; a VJ process evaluates the results of tentative
plans, and saves evaluation results in the KD.
Process nodes act hierarchically. The BG processes form a command tree: each input task
is decomposed into a plan consisting of subtasks for subordinate BG processes. Information
maintained in the KD is shared between WM processes in nodes above, below, and at the same
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level within the same sub tree. Sensory data flow up the SP hierarchy typically forms a graph;
and these data are populated by the WM in the KD at each level.
A WM predicts what will change in the world as the result of an action, and what will
stay the same, giving its solution to the frame problem. Specifically, the location and direction of
motion of objects in the world are represented in an image or map, and a simple comparison
between one frame and the next distinguishes what changes from what does not in a dynamic
environment.
A BG process receives tasks from a supervising BG process as input. The receiving BG
process has a planner that decomposes each task into a set of coordinated plans for subordinate
BG processes. During this period, tentative plans are proposed by the BG planner; the VJ
evaluates the probable results of those plans as predicted by the WM; and a plan selector in the
BG planner will choose the plan with the greatest value as the current plan. ―For each
subordinate there is an executor that issues commands, monitors progress, and compensates for
errors between desired plans and observed results. The Executors use feedback to react quickly
to emergency conditions with reflexive actions. Predictive capabilities provided by the WM may
enable the executors to generate pre-emptive behavior‖ (Albus & Barbera, 2005).
In each node, the content of the selected current plan is moved from the planner into an
―executor plan buffer‖ that initiates and guides the upcoming execution. This buffer is an
interface between the planner and executor processes, and also the interface between deliberative
and reactive processes.
At the top level of the architecture, the task is defined by the agent‘s goal that is
established typically by a human operator outside of the agent. At each successive level in the
hierarchy, tasks from the level above are decomposed into subtasks that are sent to the
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subordinate levels below. Finally at the bottom level, decomposed task commands are sent to
actuators to generate movements.
In each node of 4D/RCS, the execution is driven by a selected plan so as to reflect the
requirements of the agent‘s goal in a bottom-up fashion that is reactive to the sensory input.
Thus, at the lower levels of the architecture, the process nodes generate goal-directed reactive
behaviors, while at the higher levels, the process nodes enable decision-making. 4D/RCS has
implemented both the action preparation/selection and the action execution processes
hierarchically; it allows a more gradual, and thus smoother, transformation from the agent‘s
motivations, represented by a top-level task, to low-level actions that are directly applied to the
agent‘s actuators.
ACT-R
Adaptive Control of Thought-Rational (ACT-R) is a cognitive architecture, a theory for
simulating and understanding human cognition based on numerous facts derived from
psychological experiments (Budiu, 2013). ACT-R consists of two types of modules: memory
modules and perceptual-motor modules. Action preparation (selection) and action execution are
implemented in ACT-R by using these two types of modules separately. An agent‘s motivation is
achieved by choosing a proper action in memory modules, and the action is appropriately
executed in the motor modules.
There are two types of memory modules in ACT-R: declarative memory and production
memory. Declarative memory, represented in structures called chunks, maintains knowledge that
people are aware of, and can share with others through a set of buffers. Procedural memory,
encoded in production rules, represents knowledge outside of their awareness that is expressed in
their behavior rules (ACT-R 6.0 Tutorial, 2012). A production rule is a condition-action pair.
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The condition specifies a pattern of chunks that must be in declarative memory‘s buffers for the
production to apply; a production fires if its condition matches the chunks in the buffers. The
action specifies some actions, all of which are to be taken when the production fires (ACT-R 6.0
Tutorial, 2012). ―[A] critical cycle in ACT-R is one in which the buffers hold representations
determined by the external world and internal modules, patterns in these buffers are recognized,
a production fires, and the buffers are then updated for another cycle‖ (J. R. Anderson et al.,
2004).
ACT-R‘s perceptual-motor modules provide an elementary cognitive layer by which to
couple the environment with the high-level cognition layer, including declarative memory and
production memory (Byrne & Anderson, 2001). Perceptual-motor modules embedded in ACT-R
6.0 was heavily influenced by Kieras and Meyer‘s EPIC system (1996). Their major difference is
that, only one production rule fires each time in ACT-R, while EPIC allows multiple rules fire, a
parallel cognitive processing.
The motor module in ACT-R 6.0 is developed based on EPIC‘s manual motor processor
(module). It is designed for modeling a simulated hand to operate a virtual keyboard and mouse
(Bothell, n.d.). The motor module ―receives commands from the production system that specify a
movement style (e.g., PUNCH, as in punch a key) and the parameters necessary to execute that
movement (e.g., LEFT hand and INDEX finger)‖ (Byrne & Anderson, 2001). The movement is
generated through three phases: preparation, initiation, and execution. Below we describe each
phase in turn.
In the preparation phase, the motor module builds a list of ―features‖ which guide the
actual movement; the features include the movement‘s style and parameters. For an example, in
the movement of ―punch the key below the left index finger‖, three features of PUNCH, LEFT,
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and INDEX are involved in the preparation. (Byrne & Anderson, 2001). The amount of time that
preparation takes depends on the number of features that need to be prepared—the more that
need to be prepared, the longer it takes.
The motor module maintains a history of the last set of features that it prepared. The
actual number of features that need to be prepared depends upon two things: the complexity of
the movement to be made and the difference between that movement and the previous
movement. On one end of the scale, the motor module is simply repeating the previous
movement, then all the relevant features will already be prepared and do not require preparation.
On the other end, a request could specify a movement that requires the preparation of full
features, which have not been made in previous movements.
By default, the first 50ms after the preparation is movement initiation (Bothell, n.d.).
After that, the movement may be executed if the motor module is not already executing a
movement (Byrne & Anderson, 2001). ―If a movement is currently being executed, then the
newly prepared movement will be queued and will not be executed until the current movement
and all other movements in the queue have been executed‖ (Byrne & Anderson, 2001).
In ACT-R, ―[t]he world with which a model interacts is called the device. The device
defines the operations which the perceptual modules can use for gathering information and the
operators available to the motor modules for manipulating the device.‖ (Bothell, n.d.). The
executed movement sent out from the ACT-R motor module is passed to the related device
module in order to carry out the execution in the real world.
There is typically no direct communication between the perceptual and motor modules in
ACT-R. There is only very limited direct connectivity between perceptual and motor modules2.
The data passed to the motor module always comes from the high-level declarative or production
2

Spatial information in particular is communicated directly.
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memory. This is almost the only significant conceptual difference between LIDA‘s SMS and
ACT-R‘s motor module.
BECCA
This subsection heavily relies on a paper by Rohrer (2012). We cite it for the whole
subsection unless we explicitly cite or quote otherwise.
A Brain-Emulating Cognition and Control Architecture (BECCA) is developed to address
the problem of natural world interaction (NWI). NWI is the set of all tasks by which an agent
pursues its goal in an unstructured physical environment. BECCA consists of an automatic
feature creator and a model-based reinforcement learner to capture structure in the environment,
and to maximize rewards respectively. BECCA issues action commands to a world module, and
receives back a reward signal and observations in the form of sensory input and basic features.
The world module is not the part of the standard BECCA architecture. Rather, it maintains
simulations of the world, agent embodiment, actuators, and so on (see details later in this
section).
The feature creator identifies patterns in the input. Sensory inputs are formed into groups
based on how often they are co-active, and patterns within each group are identified as features
and added to a feature space. The creator also maps the input into that feature space at each time
step; the strongest feature voted by the projected input is activated. Features can be built
hierarchically into higher-level features. Low-level features progressively activate high-level
features, and the final set of activated features is passed to the reinforcement learner as a feature
simulation.
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In the reinforcement learner, a feature activity vector maintains the recent incoming
feature simulations. A salience filter selects a single feature from the vector for attention3, and
the working memory maintains a brief history of attended features.
The reinforcement learner forms a model of the world and uses that model to select
actions that will maximize the amount of reward. ―The model consists of a list of feature-space
transitions in the form of cause-effect pairs, each with an associated count and reward value. At
each time step, the previous working memory is compared to the list of causes and the attended
feature is compared to the list of effects. If a similar pair exists within the model, its count is
incremented, and its reward value is adjusted toward the current reward. If there isn‘t a
sufficiently similar pair, the previous working memory and attended feature are added as a new
cause-effect pair‖ (Rohrer, 2012). In this way, the model is formed and updated. ―The count
associated with each transition establishes its frequency of observation, and the reward value
represents the expected reward associated with making that transition‖ (Rohrer, 2012).
In the feature space, a transition represents a path segment that, when linked to other
segments, may take a BECCA agent to its desired state from the current one. To predict the
likely effect of a transition, the agent ranks the expected transition by 1) the matching strength
between the current state and the cause of the transition, and 2) the count of the transition, and
selects the transition with the highest rank.
Many effects are conditional on the actions selected by the agent. If an expected
transition has both high similarity to the current state and high reward, and involves an agent‘s
action on it, that action will be selected and executed.

3

From the viewpoint of LIDA, this selection acts as the beginning of an agent‘s consciousness, and the
most salient feature is the content of consciousness.
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There are two types of action selection in BECCA, deliberative and reactive. Their major
difference regards the content of the current state that is used in the prediction of transitions and
in the action selection. In deliberative action selection, only the working memory (the recently
attended features) is used to seed predictions and action selections from the model, while the
entire feature activity vector is used in reactive action selection. The final selected action results
from a nonlinear sum of the actions selected by the two selection modes. The deliberative action
is also fed back to the working memory so that the action‘s effect can be recorded as part of the
previous working memory content when the model is trained on the following time step.
A world module maintains 1) the environment—the simulation of the real world with
which humans interact; 2) the physical embodiment of the agent—the virtual actuators and
sensors of the hardware and the mechanisms that couple them; 3) preprocessing between
sensors/actuators and the BECCA agent; and 4) a reward calculator providing reward value to
the model of reinforcement learner4. From the viewpoint of action, a preprocessing step occurs
between the selected action and the actuators; this step may include the incorporation of
coordinated multi-actuator motions, fixed motion primitives, and heuristic goal pursuit
subroutines.
An action processing mechanism unique to BECCA is its two-step action selection
process: 1) Certain transitions, cause-effect pairs, are predicted (selected), and 2) an action is
selected from the predicted transitions if the effect of the transition with the highest expectation
relies on that action. These three components, cause, action, and effect, may be represented and
organized differently in other architectures. For example, in many other architectures such as
ACT-R and Soar (see its section below), a production rule is used to represent a condition-action
4

A BECCA agent is not autonomous because its action decision is not driven by an agenda or
motivation inside but by artificial rewards created outside of the agent.
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pair, corresponding to cause and action in BECCA; while in LIDA, all of three components are
encapsulated together: a data structure called a scheme includes context, action, and result,
corresponding to BECCA‘s cause, action, and effect respectively.
Another issue is that the action execution process is outside the standard BECCA
architecture. The commands for controlling actuators are not generated by the BECCA agent, but
rather by the preprocessing of a world module. Also, the world module maintains the domain
knowledge; this allows the BECCA agent to remain unchanged between many different domains
(tasks). A similar strategy is implemented in Soar as well: its operator application doesn‘t really
perform the action on actuators but an external program is always necessary to handle the final
execution (performance). In contrast, some architectures do involve the action execution process
in their architecture, such as ACT-R and LIDA.
CERA-CRANIUM
We cite a paper (Arrabales, Ledezma, & Sanchis, 2009) for this entire subsection of
CERA-CRANIUM. Other citations or quotations will be explicitly noted in the text.
The Conscious and Emotional Reasoning Architecture (CERA) is a cognitive architecture
structured in layers, providing a flexible framework with which to integrate different cognitive
models of consciousness. CERA offers a basic hypothesis that conscious contents emerge as a
result of competition and collaboration between specialized processors (functions). The
Cognitive Robotics Architecture Neurologically Inspired Underlying Manager (CRANIUM)
provides services through which CERA can execute thousands of asynchronous but coordinated
concurrent processes.
CERA is structured in four layers, which are as follows:
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1)

The sensory-motor services layer comprises a set of communication services that

provide a uniform access interface for the agent‘s physical sensors and actuators.
2)

The physical layer is responsible for the low-level representations and

preparations of the agent‘s sensors and actuators. Actuator commands are finally regulated at this
level.
3)

The mission-specific layer maintains complex perceptions and behaviors that are

combined from and decomposed to the single sensory-motor content. Complex behaviors
represent the agent‘s missions; one mission typically involves several goals.
4)

The core layer includes a set of modules that perform higher cognitive functions.

CERA is designed to allow customized core modules, such as attention, preconscious
management, memory management, and self-coordination.
A CRANIUM workspace implements a set of specialized processors and a shared access
working memory for the processors. Each of these processors is designed to perform a specific
function, cooperating and competing with other functions. A CERA agent has two hierarchically
arranged CRANIUM workspaces. The low-level workspace is located in the CERA physical
layer and the high-level is located in the CERA mission specific layer. Based on the two
CRANIUM workspaces, the perception flows are organized bottom-up in packages called single
percepts, complex percepts, and mission percepts. Meanwhile in the same workspaces, a topdown action5 flow includes mission behaviors, simple behaviors, and single actions; behaviors
are iteratively decomposed until a sequence of atomic actions is obtained.
The core layer‘s operations are problem domain dependent. The operations are directed
by the problem‘s interests, meta-goals, instead of mission-specific goals coming from lower
5

The term ―action‖ is an abstract concept; it refers to a class of action-kind concepts organized in
different levels, including mission behaviors, simple behaviors, and single actions.
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layers. Meta-goals shape the overall resulting behaviors. At any given time, a number of possible
behaviors are generated in the CRANIUM workspaces; however, only those behaviors that are
directed to the same locations as the represented meta-goals are likely to be selected and finally
executed.
There are three types of processors related to the action process implemented in the
CRANIUM workspaces.
1)

Action planners transform the input behavior into the corresponding sequence of

atomic actions that are submitted for eventual execution, so as to achieve the behavior‘s
missions.
2)

Action preprocessors prepare the atomic actions generated from action planners.

Action preprocessors build so-called ―single action constructs‖ to provide specific contextual
data for actions. ―Proprioceptive sensory data is also included in order to adapt actions to the
current position of the actuators‖ (Arrabales et al., 2009).
3)

Reactive processors are typically located in the CERA physical layer. They

provide a quick response to stimuli that are considered harmful or highly undesired for the agent.
These processors build simple behaviors to diminish or prevent negative consequences when
unsafe or undesired situations are detected, without the participation of upper cognitive
processes.
In summary, the CERA-CRANIUM action process supports both action selection—the
selection between behaviors driven by the domain independent meta-goals—and the action
execution—the decomposition from a behavior to a sequence of atomic actions, implemented by
the action planners and the final execution preparation in the physical layer. CERA-CRANIUM
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also establishes the interface between the agent and its environment in the sensory-motor
services layer, providing the agent with the necessary environmental specifications.
CLARION
CLARION stands for Connectionist Learning with Adaptive Rule Induction ON-line.
The purpose of this architecture is to capture all the essential cognitive processes within an
individual cognitive agent (Sun, 2003, 2006). CLARION consists of a number of subsystems,
including the action-centered subsystem (the ACS), the non-action-centered subsystem (the
NACS), the motivational subsystem (the MS), and the metacognitive subsystem (the MCS). The
ACS implements the action decision making of an individual cognitive agent (Sun, 2003). The
MS motivates an agent to choose its actions by means of the rewards or gains which the agent
seeks to maximize. The MS influences the working of the ACS by providing the context in
which the goal and the rewards of the ACS are set (Sun, 2006).
The ACS consists of two levels of representation: the top level for explicit and the bottom
level for implicit knowledge. The implicit knowledge generally does not have associated
semantic labels, and is less accessible. Accessibility refers to the direct and immediate
availability of mental content to the major operations that act on it. The bottom level is a direct
mapping from perceptual information to actions, implemented in backpropagation neural
networks6 involving distributed representations, whose representational units in the hidden layer
are capable of accomplishing tasks, but are generally not individually meaningful (Sun, 2003).
Furthermore, the ACS might be composed of multiple instances of the backpropagation neural
network, and a selection process is proposed to choose one of them. In contrast, the explicit
knowledge is more accessible, manipulable, and has conceptual meaning (Sun, 2006). At the top
6

Learning of implicit knowledge (the backpropagation network) transpires at the bottom level. ―In this
learning setting, there is no need for external teachers providing desired input/output mappings. This
(implicit) learning method may be cognitively justified‖ (Sun, 2006).
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level, a number of explicit action rules are stored, which are usually in the following form:
current-state-condition  action (Sun, 2003). An agent can select an action in a given state by
choosing an applicable rule. The output of a rule is an action recommendation, which is similar
to the output from the bottom level (Sun, 2003).
The two levels implemented in CLARION‘s ACS operate independently: each of them
makes action decisions in parallel based on the current state. The action sent out from both top
and bottom levels are all performable. The final output action of the ACS is a combination of the
output actions from the top and bottom levels. On the other hand, CLARION also models an
interaction between the top and bottom levels, as well as between explicit and implicit
knowledge. The input state or the output action to the bottom level is structured using a number
of input or action dimensions; each of the dimensions has a number of possible values. At
CLARION‘s top level, an action rule‘s condition or action is represented as a high-level node
which is connected to all the specified dimensional values of the inputs or actions at the bottom
level (Sun, 2003).
The overall algorithm of CLARION‘s action decision making consists of a structure that
goes from perception to actions, and ties them together through the top and bottom levels of the
ACS‘s cognitive processes as follows: ―Observing the current state of the world, the two levels
of processes within the ACS (implicit and explicit) make their separate decisions in accordance
with their own knowledge, and their outcomes are somehow ‗combined‘. Thus, a final selection
of an action is made and the action is then performed‖ (Sun, 2003). This decision making
mechanism covers both action selection (preparation) and action execution. The top level of the
mechanism provides the agent‘s internal goal for action execution, and the bottom level provides
real-time environmental information. In contrast, in LIDA, we hypothesize that the two facets of
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action, understandable and executable, cannot coexist in one presentation of action: action
selection provides explicit desires of the action, and then action execution implicitly perform it.
Both explicit and implicit representations of action act linearly but not in parallel, and neither of
them can be both understandable and executable.
Note that the specifics of the agent‘s actuators are not involved in the representation of
output actions (motor commands). This means the output performable actions of CLARION are
independent of the motors of the robot‘s actuators; this is different than the executable motor
commands mentioned in the introduction.
Additionally, learning has been applied in CLARION‘s ACS in three distinct ways: 1) the
learning of implicit knowledge at the bottom level; 2) bottom-up learning, or learning explicit
knowledge at the top level by utilizing implicit knowledge acquired in the bottom level; and 3)
top-down learning, the assimilation at the bottom level of explicit knowledge from the top level
(which must have previously been established through bottom-up learning) (Sun, 2003).
EPIC
This review of EPIC mainly relies on an EPIC overview paper (Kieras & Meyer, 1997).
We cite the paper for this entire subsection, unless explicit citations or quotations are claimed in
the text.
Executive Process-Interactive Control (EPIC) is a cognitive architecture created for
modeling human task performance. EPIC has three processing modules: 1) sensory processors,
2) motor processors, and 3) a cognitive processor that represents a general procedure as a set of
production rules to perform a complex multimodal task. During the execution of a procedure,
EPIC specifies both the production-rule programming for the cognitive processor as well as the
relevant perceptual and motor processing parameters.
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Specifically, there are visual and auditory processors that accept multimodal stimuli as
perceptual input. This input is stored in the corresponding working memory located in the
cognitive processor.
The motor processors produce a variety of simulated movements for the hands, eyes, and
vocal organs. From the cognitive processor, an action‘s command is sent to a motor processor
that consists of the movement type (name) and certain parameters.
There are two steps for a complete movement: a preparation and an execution. In the
preparation, the motor processor transforms the movement type (name) into a set of movement
features and generates them. ―The time to generate the features depends on how many features
can be reused from the previous movements (repeated movements can be initiated sooner), and
how many features have been generated in advance‖ (Kieras & Meyer, 1997). The ensuing
execution step begins with an initiation phase, followed by the actual physical movement. In
addition to reusing the features remaining from previously executed movements, the movement
features may be prepared in advance. ―If the task permits the movement to be anticipated, the
cognitive processor can command the motor processor to prepare the movement in advance by
generating all of the required features and saving them in motor memory‖ (Kieras & Meyer,
1997).
Rather than the voluntary movements produced by various motor processors, as
mentioned above, the oculomotor processor may produce the involuntary (reflexive) eye
movements, either saccades or small smooth adjustments in response to the visual situation.
In the cognitive processor, there is a set of production rules that specify which actions are
performed in certain situations to accomplish a task. The format for a rule is <rule-name> IF
<condition> THEN <action>. The rule condition will test the contents of the production system
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working memory. The rule action will then add or remove information from the working
memory, or send a command to the motor processors. Motor working memory stores information
about the current state of the motor processors.
The cognitive processor operates cyclically. During each cycle, the contents of working
memory are first updated with the perceptual input information and the previous cycle‘s
modifications; then the contents of the production system working memory are updated based on
the rules that fire, and the action commands of the firing rules are sent to the motor processors. A
unique feature of EPIC is that it will fire all rules in which conditions match the contents of
working memory, and will execute all of the corresponding actions; in other words, the EPIC
cognitive processor allows parallel cognitive processing.
The EPIC model builder should provide 1) the task environment, either physical or
simulated, which includes the characteristics of relevant objects external to an EPIC agent, 2) a
set of tasks which specify the environmental events, 3) task-specific sensory data encodings
(representations), and 4) the task procedures represented as production-rules.
In summary, regarding the action process in EPIC, action selection and action execution
have been implemented by production rules firing in the cognitive processor, and movement
preparation and execution in the motor processors separately.
GLAIR
We cite a paper (Shapiro & Bona, 2010) for this subsection, unless other citations or
quotations are explicitly mentioned in the text.
Grounded Layered Architecture with Integrated Reasoning (GLAIR) is a multi-layered
cognitive architecture for embodied agents. In GLAIR, the highest layer is the Knowledge Layer
(KL), which contains the agent‘s beliefs, and performs reasoning and selects acts. The middle
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layer is the Perceptuo-Motor Layer (PML), which grounds the KL symbols in perceptual
structures and primitive actions. The lowest layer is the Sensori-Actuator Layer (SAL), which
contains the controllers of the sensors and actuators of the hardware or software agent.
The KL contains the beliefs of the agent; with respect to action, it includes 1) plans for
carrying out complex acts and for achieving goals, 2) beliefs about the preconditions and effects
of acts, and 3) policies about when, and under what circumstances, acts should be performed.
The PML is responsible for the communication between the KL and the SAL by three
top-down sub layers: the PMLa, the PMLb, and the PMLc. The PMLa grounds the KL symbols,
providing primitive actions; the PMLc abstracts the sensors and actuators into basic behavioral
repertoire of the robot. The PMLb translates and communicates between the PMLa and the
PMLc.
GLAIR agents execute a sense-reason-act cycle. The original focus of the GLAIR design
is on reasoning, but not problem solving or goal-achievement such as ACT-R. Its basic driver is
based on reasoning: either thinking about some perceptual input, or answering some question. If
the input (typically a natural language utterance) is a statement or a question, the GLAIR agent
will output the proposition of the statement or the answer to the question respectively. A later
added acting component allows a GLAIR agent to obey a command, to perform an act and to
achieve a goal. When the input is a command, the agent will perform the indicated act,
implementing an action process that is the focus of this review.
An act consists of an action and one or more arguments. For an example, ―the term find
(Bill) denotes the act of finding Bill (by looking around in a room for him), composed of the
action find and the object Bill‖ (Shapiro & Bona, 2010). Acts may be classified as either
external, mental, or control. External acts affect the outside world. Mental acts affect the agent‘s

46

beliefs and policies. Control acts are the control structures used to support ground computational
processes such as inference operations so as to maintain the GLAIR acting system.
GLAIR acts may also be classified as primitive, defined, or composite. Primitive acts are
the basic acts predefined in the PMLa. Composite acts consist of primitive acts. A defined act is
the abstracted identifier of a plan; if a GLAIR agent is to perform a defined act, it ―deduces it‖ to
a plan and performs it. Such a plan is an act, which can be either a primitive, composite, or
defined. It is assumed that a plan is ―closer‖ to primitive acts than a defined act. A defined act
may have different plans depending on circumstances. The use of conditional plans has allowed
a GLAIR agent to select among alternative procedures to perform.
The procedure for performing an act consists of several steps:
1)

To attempt to achieve the preconditions of the act and, if it is a defined act, to

prepare a set of candidate plans that can be used to perform the act.
2)

If the act is a defined act, only its most suitable plan is tried, after which the agent

will automatically consider it successful.
3)

Effects of the act are derived before the act is performed; and after that, the agent

will consider all the effects of the act to hold.
In GLAIR, the act is represented in the same formalism as other declarative knowledge
such as the agent‘s beliefs. However, the declarative knowledge and the act are maintained by
the KL and the PMLa layers separately. In this way, the declarative and procedure knowledge
are represented with the same formalism but operated in different levels.
The PMLa layer grounds the KL by providing primitive actions, transforming high-level
actions to low-level. Although the actions maintained in PMLa are primitive, they are
independent of the implementation of the agent‘s body. It is the PMLc layer which directly
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abstracts the actuators7 of the robot into the basic behavioral repertoire of the robot body. The
primitive actions in the PMLa are translated to these basic behavioral repertoires—the basic
execution units of GLAIR—through PMLb.
Two steps occur during the process of action execution: 1) actions are initially selected in
the KL driven by reasoning results and translated into their primitive format in the PMLa layer;
and 2) the primitive actions are translated to actuator-dependent basic behavioral repertoires in
PMLc through PMLb, and then those basic units are sent to SAL for execution.
ICARUS
We cite a paper (Pat Langley & Choi, 2006) for this entire subsection. Other citations or
quotations will be notated explicitly.
ICARUS is a cognitive architecture for physical agents that has been influenced by
results from cognitive psychology. ICARUS‘s most basic mechanism, conceptual inference,
operates by matching long-term conceptual structures against short-term perceptual data and
beliefs. Based on the inference, ICARUS operates processes for goal selection and skill
execution.
In order to perceive the states of the external environment, ICARUS incorporates a
perceptual buffer (short-term memory) that describes aspects of the environment. The element
stored in this memory responds to a particular object, and characterizes the object‘s
specifications at the current time step. ICARUS also includes a conceptual memory, which
contains long-term structures that are the classifications of the environmental state. During each
cycle of conceptual inference, objects are perceived first into the perceptual buffer, where they
begin to match against long-term conceptual classifications. The system updates its belief
7

In the original paper (Shapiro & Bona, 2010), the authors use the term ―effectors‖ instead of
―actuators‖ as we do here.
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memory based on the results of this matching. The elements in the belief memory describe
relations among objects. ICARUS repeats this inference process, updating its beliefs about the
environment over time.
In order to take action in the environment, ICARUS has a performance mechanism that
concerns goals the agent wants to achieve, skills the agent can execute to reach them, and
intentions about which skills to pursue.
Specifically, ICARUS includes a goal memory that contains a list of the agent‘s
objectives. The goal is a set of concept instances that the agent wants to achieve, and the goal
memory takes the same form as belief memory. An agent needs to select only one goal at a time
among multiple elements in goal memory. On each time, it chooses the goal with the highest
priority that is not yet achieved.
ICARUS has a long-term skill memory that contains skills it can execute in the
environment and use to accomplish goals. Each skill has a head and a body. The head states the
skill‘s objective, and the body specifies the necessary perceptual data and beliefs of a skill.
Multiple skills may have the same head; they provide different ways to achieve the same goal
under different conditions. Once the agent has chosen a goal, it selects a skill to achieve the goal
based on a matching between the skill body‘s specifications and the agent‘s current perceptual
data and beliefs8.
The skills are organized hierarchically. ―Primitive skills‖ refers to actions that the agent
can execute directly in the environment, while non-primitive skills are goals/sub-goals that the
agent might seek to achieve. Primitive skills correspond to the executable motor commands
mentioned in the introduction. During the execution of a non-primitive skill, the agent must find
8

In LIDA, a similar matching occurs in the process of recruiting schemes. Schemes are selected based
on a matching between the agent‘s conscious contents, the most salient current situation, and the
scheme‘s context and result contents.
49

a path downward from its goal to one or more terminal primitive skills in the hierarchy. Once the
agent has selected a skill path for execution, it invokes the actions referred to the primitive skill
or skills in the path.
If the applicable skill is not found, an impasse appears, and the agent invokes its problem
solver for achieving the goal. The agent decomposes the goal into sub-goals iteratively until find
the skills for achieving them. The skills applicable for all sub-goals are finally selected and then
executed to achieve the goal. A new skill is learned for the goal by structuring the applicable
skills for those sub-goals. The similar impasse resolving mechanism has been implemented in
Soar (see its section below) as well.
LIDA
For historical reasons LIDA stands for Learning Intelligent Distribution Agent. The
LIDA Model (Franklin et al., 2014) is a conceptual, systems level model of human mental
processes, used to develop biologically-inspired intelligent software agents and robots. It
implements and fleshes out a number of psychological and neuropsychological theories, but is
primarily based on Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988, 2002).
The LIDA Model is grounded in the LIDA cognitive cycle. Each cognitive cycle consists
of three phases: 1) the LIDA agent first senses the environment, recognizes objects, and builds
its understanding of the current situation; 2) by a competitive process, as specified by Global
Workspace Theory (Baars, 1988), it then decides what portion of the represented situation should
be attended to, and broadcast to the rest of the system; 3) finally, the broadcast portion of the
situation supplies information allowing the agent to choose an appropriate action to execute, and
modulates learning (Franklin et al., 2014). The simulated human mind can be viewed as
functioning via a continual, overlapping sequence of these cycles.
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The dual aspects of action are represented in the LIDA Model as the distinct processes of
action selection and action execution. Specifically, the sensory data retrieved in LIDA influences
the action process at two ―levels‖. At one level, sensory data is filtered through the
understanding and attention phases, and then helps recruit appropriate actions in the action
selection process; the selected result is used to initiate certain processes operating in the
concomitant action execution process, ultimately generating executable low-level actions. At the
other level, the sensory data is sent through a dorsal stream channel directly to the action
execution process for assisting the execution (See Figure 1).
The concept of scheme has been borrowed to implement LIDA‘s action selection. A
scheme is a data structure representing the procedural knowledge stored in LIDA‘s Procedural
Memory. It is composed of three components: a context, an action9, and a result. With some
reliability, the result is expected to occur when the action is taken in its context. In LIDA‘s
action selection process, one or more schemes are recruited based on the most salient current
situation. And then, the schemes‘ context and result components are bound with additional
information from the current situation, so that the recruited schemes are instantiated into
behaviors. A behavior has a data structure similar to a scheme, but the components of context
and result have been instantiated with concrete values. Finally, a behavior is selected based on
the agent‘s motivation and its understanding of the current situation.
The process of action execution has been recently added to LIDA, modeled by the
Sensory Motor System (SMS) (Dong & Franklin, 2014b). Two other LIDA modules, Action
Selection and Sensory Memory, provide relevant information—a selected behavior and the
sensory data through a dorsal stream channel, respectively–as inputs to the SMS. The SMS sends
9

In this context, the term ―action‖ refers to a component of a scheme. This differs from the general
usage, such as in the phrase ―action execution‖. In this document, we use ―action‖ in the general sense,
while ―action of a scheme‖ refers to a particular component of that scheme.
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out motor commands to an agent‘s actuators to execute its selected action in the environment.
Within the SMS, three data structure types have been proposed—the motor command (MC), the
motor plan (MP), and the motor plan template (MPT)—and three types of processes have been
modeled: online control, specification, and MPT selection.
A motor command (MC) is applied to an agent‘s actuator. Every MC has two
components: a motor name, and a command value. The motor name indicates which motor of an
actuator the MC specifically controls, while the command value of a MC encodes the extent of
the command applied to the motor.
An MP acts like a MC generator that generates MCs based on the sensory data
transmitted via the dorsal stream. An MP is implemented based on the principles of the
subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1991), a reactive structure. In the subsumption architecture, 1)
the sensory data is linked to directly thus determining the selection of motor commands that
drive the actuators; 2) it decomposes a robot‘s control architecture into a set of task-achieving
behaviors; and 3) it does not maintain any internal model of the world10, and is without any
explicit representations. The MP generates motor commands as the output of the SMS to the
environment (using actuators), while environmental data directly influence the generation
process through the dorsal stream channel from Sensory Memory. These cyclically occurring
processes are called the online control process of the SMS.
An MPT is an abstract MP that resides in an agent‘s long-term memory (Sensory Motor
Memory in LIDA). It has a set of motor commands (MCs) that are not yet bound with the
command values, whereas after a specification process, the motor commands are bound with
specific values, instantiating the MPT into a concrete MP. Both sensory data from the dorsal
10

Although no central world state is one of the essences of the subsumption architecture, implicit
understanding and expectation of the environment has been built into the architecture by its layered
structure.
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stream and the selected behavior determine the specification process (Dong & Franklin, 2014b).
MPTs and MPs have very similar structures, so they are designed with nearly the same data
structure. Their major differences are 1) an MPT is persistently stored in a long-term memory,
while an MP is short-term, and created anew each time it is used; and 2) typically an MP‘s
command values have been specified, while those of an MPT have not.
As the SMS‘s initial process, A MPT selection acts to select and initiate a MPT by an
incoming selected behavior before the MPT is specified into a concrete motor plan. MPT
selection chooses one MPT from the set of those associated with the selected behavior. It
connects action selection to action execution. Currently this selection is built in by the agent
designer (Dong & Franklin, 2014b).
A sensory motor learning has been implemented in LIDA‘s SMS. See the learning in
Chapter 6.
Soar
Soar is a cognitive architecture in pursuit of general intelligent agents (J. Laird, 2008).
―The design of Soar is based on the hypothesis that all deliberate goal-oriented behavior can be
cast as the selection and application of operators to a state. A state is a representation of the
current problem-solving situation; an operator transforms a state (makes changes to the
representation); and a goal is a desired outcome of the problem-solving activity‖ (J. E. Laird et
al., 2012).
Soar has separate memories for descriptions of its current situation and its long-term
knowledge. It represents the current situation in its working memory, which is Soar‘s short-term
memory and maintains the sensory data, results of intermediate inferences, active goals, and
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active operators (J. E. Laird et al., 2012). The long-term knowledge specifies how to respond to
different situations in the working memory so as to solve a specific problem.
All of Soar‘s long-term knowledge is organized around the functions of operator
selection and operator application, which are organized as a processing cycle as described below
(J. Laird, 2008; J. E. Laird et al., 2012).
1)

Elaboration. Knowledge with which to compute entailments of short-term

memory, creating new descriptions of the current situation that can affect operator selection and
application indirectly.
2)

Operator Proposal. Knowledge with which to propose operators that are

appropriate to the current situation based on features of the situation tested in the condition of the
production rules.
3)

Operator Comparison (Evaluation). Knowledge of how to compare candidate

operators, to create preferences for some proposed operators based on the current situation and
goal.
4)

Operator Selection. Knowledge with which to select an operator based on the

comparisons. ―If the preferences are insufficient for making a decision, an impasse arises and
Soar automatically creates a substate in which the goal is to resolve that impasse. … The
impasses and resulting substates provide a mechanism for Soar to deliberately perform any of the
functions (elaboration, proposal, evaluation, application) that are performed
automatically/reactively with rules.‖ (J. Laird, 2008)
5)

Operator Application. Knowledge of how the actions of an operator are performed

on the environment, to modify the state.

54

Four of the above functions require retrieving long-term knowledge that is relevant to the
current situation: Elaborating, Operator Proposal, Operator Comparison, and Operator
Application. These functions are driven by the knowledge represented as production rules (J. E.
Laird et al., 2012). A production rule has a set of conditions and a set of actions. The
production‘s actions are performed if its conditions match working memory; that is, the
production fires (J. E. Laird et al., 2012). The other function, Operator Selection, is performed by
Soar's decision procedure, which is a fixed procedure that makes a decision upon the knowledge
that has been retrieved (J. E. Laird et al., 2012).
An operator contains preconditions and actions; its action differs from a production rule‘s
action. The operator action is an output for the agent to its internal or external environment,
while actions of a production rule generally either create preferences for operator selection, or
create/remove working memory elements (J. E. Laird et al., 2012).
When Soar interacts with the environment, it must make use of a mechanism that allow it
to effect changes in that environment; the mechanism provided in Soar is called output functions
(J. E. Laird et al., 2012). During the operator application process, Soar productions could
respond to an operator by creating a structure on the output link, a substructure which represents
motor commands for manipulating output. Then, an output function would look for specific
motor command in this output link, and translate this into the format required by the external
program that controls the agent‘s actuators (J. E. Laird et al., 2012). ―[In the external program,]
functions that execute motor commands in the environment use the values on the output links to
determine when and how they should execute an action‖ (J. E. Laird et al., 2012). This means
that it is Soar‘s external program, not its output functions, that specifies how to execute the
action in detail (when and how).
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In the case of Soar‘s output, motor commands, which cannot be directly performed
(executed) on the external world, an external program is always necessary to handle the final
―real‖ execution (performance) for Soar. Soar does not cover the representation of environmental
information related to action. This allows it to maintain generality with a clear standard, without
the necessity of considering every possible domain that the Soar agent might live in. Note the
term ―motor commands‖ in Soar expresses completely different concepts than in other
architectures, such as LIDA, although it is used to represent the final output data in both cases. In
LIDA, motor commands are executable, while in Soar they are not. By saying that motor
commands are ―executable‖, we mean that these commands 1) are able to be applied to the
agent‘s actuators directly, and 2) are maintained in an order appropriate to both the agent‘s
internal goal and the current environment‘s dynamics.
Conclusions
We realize that the action execution processes implemented in the cognitive architectures
described above have many similar representations and procedures though they use different
structures. We conclude with some general observations regarding the nature of these
representations and procedures, followed by a summary.
Inside Action Execution
Each cognitive architecture having a representation at an explicit level of knowledge,
typically also needs a process that transforms high-level knowledge into motor-level commands;
that is, action execution. For example, a task (sub task) is transformed into task commands in
4D/RCS, a production rule‘s action into movements in ACT-R and EPIC, a behavior into atomic
actions in CERA-CRANIUM, an act into basic behavioral repertoires (the basic execution units)
in GLAIR, a non-primitive skill into primitive skills in ICARUS, and a behavior into a sequence
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of motor commands in LIDA. Some other architectures, such as BECCA and Soar, prepare the
actions for external programs to finish the action execution. These architectures accomplish only
the initial phase of the action execution process. CLARION has a unique action decision
mechanism in its two levels of representation. As we have discussed above, this mechanism
covers both action selection (preparation) and action execution (performance), though its action
performance does not maintain the specifics of the actuators within the representations of the
output actions.
The Cooperation between Action Selection and Execution
A goal-directed action resulting from action selection concomitantly initiates the initial
action execution process. This process may be implemented in two different ways. One
possibility is to decompose the selected goal-directed action into primitive actions, in which case
the action‘s data structure is gradually broken down from high-level to low-level without
qualitative changes, such as tasks in 4D/RCS, behaviors and atomic actions in CERACRANIUM, actions in CLARION, skills in ICARUS, and operators in Soar. The other option is
to map the selected goal-directed action to another type of action representation—the action‘s
data structure has been qualitatively changed—that enables the generation of the ensuing lowlevel actions, such as a production rule‘s action mapping to a movement style in ACT-R and
EPIC, a transition mapping to an action in BECCA, and a behavior mapping to a Motor Plan
Template (MPT) in LIDA. GLAIR combines the natures of these two options: it first
decomposes acts into primitive ones, and then translates them into actuator-dependent basic
behavioral repertoires.
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Environmental Information for Action Execution
During the action execution process, additional environmental information is usually
supplied to specify and adjust the final command values for execution. For example, in both
ACT-R and EPIC, a preparation phase operates during the action execution process to build and
specify a list of ―features‖; the features include the movement‘s style—the name of a low-level
action‘s identifier—and the values of its parameters. In CERA-CRANIUM‘s action execution,
action preprocessors provide specific contextual data for preparing atomic actions. In LIDA, the
sensory data sensed through its dorsal stream channel is sent directly to the action execution
process, so that a Motor Plan Template (MPT) is instantiated into a Motor Plan (MP) that
generates the final motor commands.
This additional information might be directly sensed from the environment through
sensory processes; in this case, a direct communication between the perceptual and motor
modules is implemented to assist the action execution. For example, in CLARION‘s bottom
level, perceptual information directly maps to actions, and in LIDA, sensory data may be sent to
the motor system directly through a dorsal stream channel. On the other hand, this environmental
information might come from high-level cognitive modules that store the current state of the
environment. For example in ACT-R, the data passed to the motor module comes from highlevel declarative or production memory.
Summary
Based on the above review, we can identify certain common characteristics for action
execution. It provides an elementary cognitive layer by which a cognitive architecture couples
the environment with its high-level cognitive modules, including action selection. Action
execution finalizes an agent‘s intention, so that it generates a cognitive architecture‘s output.
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Action execution involves domain specifications—including environmental specifications and
those of the agent‘s actuators—sufficient to enable execution to be actuated in the environment.
However, it does not contain so much abstract knowledge, which is the province of high-level
cognitive modules.
On the other hand, action execution may vary in concrete implementations, with respect
to its representations, procedures, and the means of cooperation with high-level cognitive
modules. Also, action execution itself may or may not be considered a standard module of a
cognitive architecture, so that architectures may differ in their degree of completion.
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4. A New Action Execution Module for LIDA: The Sensory Motor System
Introduction
I and Franklin have proposed two facets of action: ―what to do‖ and ―how to do it‖
(2014b). Following this hypothesis, the dual aspects of action are represented in the LIDA Model
as the distinct processes of action selection and action execution. Action selection has been
described in previous work (Franklin et al., 2014). Here we specify the action execution in the
form of the Sensory Motor System (SMS), a cognitive model for an action execution process in
LIDA. The SMS responds by transforming a desired understandable action, a selected behavior
in LIDA, into an executable low-level action sequence, a sequence of motor commands, and
executing them.
The next section describes the subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1986, 1991), which is
used as the SMS‘s prototype. The following section introduces the SMS concepts and its highlevel designs. Two data structure types have been proposed—the Motor Plan Template (MPT),
and the Motor Plan (MP)—and three types of processes have been modeled: online control,
specification, and MPT selection. The next section introduces the simulation of a specific action
execution process, gripping. One aspect of grip, grip aperture, has been simulated and compared
to the human performance. Furthermore, we compare the SMS of LIDA with the action
(execution) process implemented in three other cognitive architectures: ACT-R, Soar, and
CLARION. We conclude with a discussion of the benefits of modeling a natural action execution
process with the SMS for LIDA, followed by a conclusion for SMS development.
The subsumption architecture
The subsumption architecture is a parallel and distributed computation formalism for
connecting sensors to actuators (Brooks, 1986, 1991), a type of reactive structure for controlling
a robot. In the subsumption architecture, specific behaviors are merged into a comprehensive
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classification, organized in multiple layers (levels), where the components in each layer are
Augmented Finite State Machines (AFSMs). Layers (levels) or AFSMs are connected by two
types of processes: inhibit or suppress, which are represented by encircled uppercase I or
uppercase S respectively. As shown in Figure 2, a signal coming into the high-level input of the
inhibit process—from AFSM 2 to the encircled uppercase I—terminates the signal passing
through the low-level input—from AFSM 1 to the encircled uppercase I. The suppress process,
encircled uppercase S, operates as does the inhibit process except that its high-level input signal
replaces (not terminates) the low-level one. Inside the architecture, there are no direct channels
between modules, nor is there any central forum for communication (Connell, 1989b); the
environment is used as the communication medium because ― [t]he world is its own best model‖
(Brooks, 1990, p. 3).
Sensory data 3

AFSM 3

Sensory data 2

AFSM 2

Sensory data 1

AFSM 1

Level 2

Level 1

I

S

Motor commands

Figure 2. The subsumption architecture example

The capabilities of the subsumption architecture match many required features of action
execution as we model it (see next Section). First, the subsumption architecture fulfills the
requirements for modeling online control of action execution. In this architecture, the sensor is
directly linked to the motor that drives the actuators. This kind of mechanism follows the
hypothesis that the executable action is driven by the content of bottom-up sensory information
coming through the dorsal stream.
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Second, the subsumption architecture also satisfies the requirements of transforming an
understandable action, a selected behavior, into executable motor commands. Marc Jeannerod,
citing the work of Searle (Searle, 1983), built upon the concept that covert action representation
is followed by overt real executed action. In detail, ―the conceptual content, when it exists (i.e.,
when an explicit desire to perform the action is formed), is present first. Then, at the time of
execution, a different mechanism comes into play where the representation loses its explicit
character and runs automatically to reach the desired goal‖ (Jeannerod, 2006, pp. 4-5). We
believe the concepts used in SMS are the same as Jeannerod‘s, although our terminologies
differ.1
In order to run automatically to reach the desired goal without ―its explicit character‖, a
general idea is to decompose an understandable action into low-level executable motor
commands, and the desired goal into separate sub-goals to be accomplished with low-level tasks.
The subsumption architecture supports this kind of mechanism. ―It‘s a method of decomposing a
robot‘s control architecture into a set of task-achieving behaviors or competences‖ (Dawson,
n.d.). In other words, the architecture decomposes both the action and the desired goal into motor
commands and competences, respectively. A competence refers to a low-level task that could be
considered a link connecting a desired goal to executable motor commands. Although the
subsumption architecture is typically considered the classic example of a reactive structure, in
the present case, a competence actually works proactively as well because of its task-achieving
behavior. It achieves both the ―how to do‖ and the ―for what purpose‖ of an action though the
purposes it aims to achieve are very specific and low-level. In the subsumption architecture, a

1

‗An explicit desire to perform the action‘ refers to a selected behavior; ‗a different mechanism‘ is our
SMS; and ‗the representation [that] loses its explicit character‘ indicates executable motor commands.
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competence conceptually plays a role like a watershed, dividing the desired understandable
actions and executable motor commands.
Furthermore, the subsumption architecture has no central control, and thus it develops a
piece of cognition that minimizes the role of representation (Brooks, 1991; De Vega, Glenberg,
& Graesser, 2008, p. 72). This fact is consistent with our design requirement, as Jeannerod
proposed above, for the absence of an understandable action‘s ―explicit character‖ in the action
execution process. This explains why action execution remains outside the awareness of the
agent, although it could become aware of the execution indirectly. We will discuss this later (See
below sections).
On the other hand, the subsumption architecture doesn‘t interact with high-level goaldirected actions, which is an essential requirement of the SMS. Also, the parameters designed in
the architecture are not changeable, so the motor commands it generated cannot be specified at
runtime. We have extended the subsumption architecture in the design of SMS to meet these
points: interaction with high-level actions and dynamically specifying parameters at runtime. The
SMS‘s full definition is described in the next section.
Conceptual Design of the SMS
This section introduces the concepts relatively abstractly, so that it supports a high-level
design of SMS, filling the gap between the hypotheses regarding the human mental and
behavioral, and the detailed computational designs of SMS, such as its data structures and
algorithms. Working towards a biologically inspired understanding of the action execution
process, such as the action mentioned in the two visual systems, this section describes the
possible functional representations and processes in detail. In addition, this section describes
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reliable implementation requirements, in order to implement the action execution process
computationally as we will see later (see next section).
The SMS must transform a selected behavior into a sequence of motor commands, and
execute them using the agent‘s actuators. In this section, the emphasis is on the concept of
transformation, while task execution is introduced later in experimental parts (next section).
The motor plan and online control
The output of the SMS, a sequence of motor commands, is sent out in a certain order;
hence the agent‘s movement is not chaotic but is chosen with the intent of reaching a certain
goal. However, this ―ordering‖ effect is not a plan working inside the SMS to determine when
each motor command will be sent out. The action execution process is running in a real world
with unlimited environmental data available, much of which heavily affects the order of the
motor commands. It is hard to anticipate such environmental situations fully enough to explicitly
prepare a specific sequence of motor commands before the execution begins.
Citing the work of Herbert Simon (1969), Rodney Brooks built upon the concept that
complex behavior need not necessarily be a product of an extremely complex control system;
rather, it may simply be the reflection of a complex environment (Brooks, 1986). Therefore, in
contrast to a fixed plan, a reactive structure is introduced to model the source of ordered motor
commands (Figure 3). Inside the SMS, first a set of motor commands are built in; each of them is
represented by a ©, which is independent of any timestamp. Next is a set of triggers, represented
by Tx; a trigger activates a specific command in order to send it out as a part of the SMS output
when the input sensory data matches one or more of the trigger‘s conditions. The subscript x
stands for the number of conditions a trigger contains. Third, before sending out the commands,
a choice function chooses a command from possibly multiple candidates as the final output at
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each moment. The choice strategy must be implemented when applying this high-level design to
a concrete action execution process. The set of motor commands, the triggers, and the choice
function are referred to as a Motor Plan (MP), which specifies what to do in a particular
situation, independently of time.
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Figure 3. SMS with a MP and online control diagram
An environment located outside the SMS is shown in Figure 3 as well; it provides
environmental data to the SMS at the appropriate time through the dorsal stream (see Figure 1).
These sensory data are classified based on different modalities, such as visual, tactile, etc., and
sent to the triggers. The output of the SMS, a sequence of motor commands, executes using the
agent‘s actuators, and thereby acts on the environment. These processes occur cyclically between
the environment and the SMS, which models the hypothesis regarding one of the dorsal stream‘s
roles, online control.
As shown in Figure 3, the SMS resembles a wrapper for the MP, supporting preprocessed sensory data, and passing the MP‘s output to the agent‘s actuators acting on the
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environment. On the other side, a MP acts like an independent component inside the SMS. It
involves static data structures: a set of motor commands, as well as the triggers, implemented as
small processes.
This online control mechanism designed in the SMS reflects the ideas of a reactive
structure: it allows the MP to generate motor commands based on the sensory data, adapting to
the current environmental situation. This is inspired by the principles of the subsumption
architecture. The grounding component inside the subsumption architecture is a type of Finite
State Machine (FSM); specifically, it could be an augmented FSM (Brooks, 1986) or a module
(Connell, 1989b). As shown in Figure 4, a set of states are contained in a FSM, and an internal
variable, Current State, maintains which state is the current one. Depending on the input data, the
current state‘s transition conditions may be met so as to change the current state into another one,
updating Current State in the process. Besides a transition, some states have another attribute, a
command; the command is sent out when the state‘s transition is activated. Compared to a FSM,
a MP‘s trigger containing conditions corresponds to a FSM state plus its transition conditions,
and the trigger is capable of selecting the command based on the input data as well. The only
difference between a trigger and a FSM is that the FSM contains commands, while in a MP, a set
of motor commands is separately maintained outside of the triggers. Conceptually, a FSM equals
a trigger that points to motor commands. Representing a set of motor commands independently
from triggers provides a clearer classification between the data structure and the processes that
operate on it; also, it helps to clearly emphasize the temporal independency of the motor
commands.
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Command
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Figure 4. A FSM and its components

The choice function is generalized from the inhibit and suppress operations of the
subsumption architecture, which connect many FSMs together based on a carefully designed
structure for certain task-achieving behaviors. The choosing criteria used in inhibit and suppress
are fixedly created in a hierarchical structure—being in a higher layer gives a motor command
higher priority for selection. We generalized the implementation of a criterion, and leave its
specification to the computational design, while, as in the case of inhibit and suppress, only one
motor command is permitted to be sent out at one time as a choice result.
Motor Commands
A motor command (MC) is applied to an actuator of an agent; therefore its format relies
on the configuration of that actuator, which, theoretically, is outside the SMS‘s purview. On the
other hand, since MCs are the output of the SMS, a general MC format has been defined
according to the definitions that follow.
Every MC has two components: the motor name and a command value. The motor name
tells to which motor of an actuator the MC specifically applies. As an instance, if one joint of a
finger is considered a motor of the actuator hand, the joint‘s name then can be the motor name of
a MC.
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The command value of a MC encodes the extent of the command applied to the motor.
As an example, the command value applied to a finger‘s joint could be positive five within a real
number domain. Here the unit of a command value is not specified, which means the type of the
command is unknown: is it force, velocity, or distance? Being agnostic to a command‘s type is
reasonable because 1) conceptually, the agent need not be aware of the type of the command in
the action execution process (although the agent‘s designer must be); and 2) computationally,
since a MC‘s command type is implicitly fixed by design—e.g., the type of a command applied
to a finger‘s joint is always the force—the command type need not be explicitly declared in a
MC.
The motor plan template and specification
A set of motor commands (MCs) is prepared inside a Motor Plan (MP) and bound with
fixed command values. In order to specify a MC‘s command value before the execution
begins—thus modeling one of the dorsal stream‘s hypothesized roles, specification—a Motor
Plan Template (MPT) is proposed and a specification process is created in the SMS as depicted
in Figure 5.
A MPT is an abstract motor plan that resides in an agent‘s long-term memory (Sensory
Motor Memory in LIDA). It has a set of motor commands that are not yet bound with the
command values; after a specification process, the motor commands inside the MPT are bound
with specific command values, instantiating the MPT into a concrete MP. MPTs and MPs have
very similar structures, so they will often be designed with nearly the same data structure. Their
major differences are 1) an MPT is persistently stored in a long-term memory, while an MP is
short-term, and created anew each time it is used; and 2) most of an MP‘s command values have
been specified, while those of an MPT have not.
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Figure 5. A MPT  MP, online control, and specification diagram

Both sensory data through the dorsal stream and the selected behavior determine the
specification process. As shown in Figure 5, two cylinders lie under the set of motor commands
(©s); they receive the sensed data and the context of a selected behavior separately, and provide
the specific command values to motor commands mainly through a specification process. Each
of these cylinders represents a set of associations; every association transforms relevant
environmental features into a command value. As an example, in a grasping task, ―the hand preshapes during reaching…. The pre-shaping of the hand includes the well-known phenomenon of
‗maximum grip aperture‘ (MGA), whereby the finger grip opens more than required by the size
of the object, but proportionally to it‖ (Jeannerod, 2006, p. 5). Thus, one corresponding
association implemented in the SMS is to transform an object‘s size to the distance between
gripping fingers.
The data sensed through the dorsal stream provides environmental features‘ true value,
such as a numeric value of positive five as an object‘s width, while the context of a selected
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behavior supports the semantic values ―large‖ or ―small‖ for the object‘s size. Usually, the
command values specified in the motor commands are only relying on the sensed data, although
the context affects the command values in a few conditions (Milner & Goodale, 2008). We have
simulated some of these conditions and replicated the effects on the command values from
variation of both the sensed data and the context. Accordingly, to implement the relationship of
the effects of sensed data and the context, a suppress operation is represented by an encircled
uppercase S in Figure 5: the command values associated with the sensed data usually suppress
the values associated with the context unless either 1) there is a delay on the sensed data, 2) the
association transforming the certain sensed data is not available—unfamiliar action, or 3)
relevant objects ―need to be analyzed for their semantic or material properties‖ (Milner &
Goodale, 2008, p. 780).
The specification process is supposed to specify a MPT into a MP before the execution
begins. The motor commands (MCs) inside a MPT are bound with specific command values
during the specification process. However, there are some types of MCs whose command values
are conceptually specified in the process of online control but not in the specification process. In
the example of gripping an object, the individual finger‘s force is manipulated, not before the
action execution begins, but in the course of the execution process (Grafton, 2010). To model
this situation in the SMS, the pertinent command values are set with a default value in the
specification process first, and are then updated in the online control. An update process is
represented in Figure 5, showing that the MCs command values are updated by the values
associated with the sensed data in executing the action. We will see a simulation illustrating this
case later.
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The subsumption architecture sends out a command with a fixed built-in value, telling the
agent what to do in every moment. However, the subsumption architecture‘s reactive behavior is
typically classified as a process to answer the ―how to do‖ question of an action. This is due to
the fact that the commands the architecture sends out are low-level, the same as the elements of
environmental data, which cannot be directly recognized by humans, since they cannot describe
what the commands are, though they know a high-level process has been accomplished in some
way. Similarly, as shown in Figure 3, a MP outputs the motor command in each moment,
answering ―what to do‖ in a low-level way to the agent‘s actuators, and ―how to do it‖ at a highlevel responding for the goal-directed action initiated internally from the agent. Here the
specification process operating on a motor command—binding a specific value to it—augments
the principle of the subsumption architecture by extending the motor command with a specified
value—besides ―to do what‖, answering a question of ―how much‖. Therefore, we argue that the
SMS, a mechanism containing both online control and specification processes as shown in
Figure 5, answers the ―how to do‖ of an action at both low and high levels.
Furthermore, the SMS is not merely a reactive structure, adapting to its environment, but
also a structure that responds to the intent of a goal-directed action. A selected behavior‘s context
also affects the specification process. The high-level understanding necessary for an action‘s
effectiveness in an external environment, such as the target object features of a grip action, can
indirectly affect a MPT by specifying the values of some variables. In this way, the SMS may
serve as a sub-module of LIDA, a systems level cognitive model that covers the whole cognitive
loop from perception to action. The SMS connects LIDA‘s selected behavior to a MPT, thus
achieving the action‘s execution.
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MPT Selection
A MPT awaits initiation by an incoming selected behavior before being specified into a
concrete motor plan. From a general engineering viewpoint, a special process called MPT
selection has been created. As depicted in Figure 6, MPT selection chooses one MPT from others
also based on the selected behavior.
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Figure 6. SMS with all of its components. See text for details.
The selected behavior and the dorsal stream
The design of the SMS‘s concepts has been fully described above, and is summarized in
Figure 6. The three processes modeled inside the SMS—MPT selection, specification, and online
control—are affected by the selected behavior and/or dorsal streams. Their detailed relationships
are shown in Table 1 below.
Table 1. The selected behavior and dorsal stream affect the SMS’s processes
MPT selection

Specification

Online control

The selected behavior

Affect

Affect

Affect

Dorsal stream

N/A

Affect

Affect
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Note that the selected behavior affects the online control process because it conceptually
initiates the action execution, although it is not directly involved in the online control.
Implementation and Experiment
Different actions execute variously, due to vastly different actuators, goals, or action
execution contexts. In other words, each action needs a certain Motor Plan Template (MPT)
embedded in a Sensory Motor System (SMS) that allows the modeling of the action‘s distinctive
characteristics in the execution process.
We have implemented a MPT in a newly created SMS to model the execution of a grip
action inside a LIDA-based software agent. This MPT‘s design is both guided by the Herbert
arm controller (Brooks, Connell, & Ning, 1988; Connell, 1989a), and biologically inspired by
some hypotheses regarding the execution of human‘s grip action. The simulated results are
compared with both robotic and human data.
The involved software agent (robot and its controller) and its experimental environment
are introduced in the first two subsections, followed by a description of the simulation of
Herbert‘s arm controller and its biologically inspired modification. Finally, the SMS is linked to
LIDA where one experiment—regarding the awareness an agent to its action execution—has
been done.
The LIDA Framework and Webots
The LIDA Framework is an underlying computational software framework. ―[It] allows
the creation of new intelligent software agents and experiments based in [sic] the LIDA Model.
Its design and implementation aim to simplify this process and to permit the user to concentrate
in [sic] the specifics of the application‖ (Snaider, McCall, & Franklin, 2011, p. 141).

73

Webots is a mobile robot simulation software package. It offers a developmental
environment for rapid prototyping of 3D virtual worlds, an array of ready-made sensors and
actuators, and programmable controllers that control a robot living in that world
(www.cyberbotics.com). We use Webots as an experimental environment in which to create an
agent developed using the LIDA Framework for running our computational SMS. The technical
issue regarding the use of the Framework as a controller for a Webots robot has been addressed
with a customized environment module as an interface as shown in Figure 7. Traditionally, the
world, the robot and robot‘s controller are developed inside Webots. We created a simple robot
controller inside Webots which responds to start a LIDA Framework as a real controller only.
Rather than a typical Webots controller, the Framework serves as a robot controller by way of its
customized environment.
Webots

Delete

World
Controller

Robot

Add
The LIDA Framework

Sensory
Memory

Customized
Environment
(Interface)

……

Sensory Motor
System

Figure 7. The LIDA Framework controlling a Webots robot

The extended youBot
The youBot is a software robot bundled with the Webots installation. As shown in Figure
8 (a), its actuators are a mobile base, an arm, and two grippers; the end segment of the arm plays
the role of a hand and the grippers are attached to it. We chose this robot on the basis of its
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similarity to Herbert, whose arm controller serves as the prototype of a Grip MPT inside our
newly created SMS.

(a)

(b)

(c)

Figure 8. (a) The extended youBot, (b) infra-red beams on the hand and between the
grippers, and (c) touch sensors (dark blue, bottom view).
The sensors
Following the configuration of sensors in Herbert, we extended the youBot sensors by
additionally simulating two infra-red (IR) beams detecting the area in front of the hand, one IR
beam between the grippers as their closing trigger, and a touch sensor on the tip of each gripper.
See Figure 8 (b) and (c) for details. The extended youBot sensors are introduced in detail in
Table 2.
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Table 2. The extended youBot sensors
Short Name
Pos

Description
The arm segment positions, which can be accessed by the
Webots getPosition() method.

Tact (wrist)

The force exerted on the wrist, the joint between
penultimate and last arm segments, which can be accessed
by the Webots getMotorForceFeedback() method.

Tact (touch)

The data sensed through the touch sensors, which can be
accessed by the touch sensor‘s getValue() method.

Beam

The distance as measured by the infra-red beam between
the grippers. It is used to check whether an object is in
between, and is accessed by its getValue() method.

XIR

The distances as measured by the two infra-red beams
from the hand to any object which is in the area in front of
the hand. It is used to check whether an object is in the
area, and can be accessed by the getValue() method.

The actuators
As shown in Figure 9 (a), the youBot arm comprises five segments—from arm0 to arm4,
which are linearly connected by five joints—from joint0 to joint4. The joints‘ angles can be
modified by the Webots setPosition() method. Of these five joints, only the middle three—joint1,
joint2, and joint3—are changeable in our simulation of grip in a vertically oriented X-Y plane.
The first and distal joints don‘t act in the same plane—they rotate in X-Z plane; thus these two
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joints, joint0 and joint4, have not been used, but just being fixedly set to value of zero.
Accordingly, arm0 is considered part of the robot base, and arm4—hand is considered part of
arm3. Because of the simplification, not all joints are explicitly shown in Figure 9 (b); the reader
might have to go back to see Figure 9 (a) for details when we are talking about some formula
based on Figure 9 (b) later.

joint2

arm2

joint3

2
arm2

joint4
(wrist)

Distance

arm3
arm1
arm4
(hand)

3

arm3

joint1
Hand

arm0

XIR beams

arm1

Height

joint0
1

The surface a target
object stands on

arm0

Base

The surface the robot
stands on

(b)

(a)

Figure 9. An extended youBot controlling its arm during a grip action
One important gripping issue is that the hand must be vertical to the surface that a target
object stands on. This requirement follows from the fact that the XIR beams that detect the area
in front of the hand are at a fixed angle to the hand. This constitutes a considerable simplification
of the analogous human behavior. The human chiefly acts upright on land, however, a human‘s
trunk is usually not exactly vertical but slightly forward leaning during motion, such as running;
the line of sight adjusts dynamically—XIR does not—so that the human looks ahead constantly
while the trunk‘s angle may vary from moment to moment.
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As shown in Figure 9 (b), the hand position is controlled by the angles of joint1, joint2,
and joint3—∠1, ∠2, ∠3; their sum must equal π to satisfy the constraint of that the hand being
vertical to the surface2, as described by Eq. (1):
∠1 + ∠2 + ∠3 = π

(1)

The hand has four basic movements: lift, descend, extend, and back, each of which can
occur along one of two lines: up-down or back-forth. As shown in Figure 9 (b), regarding the updown line, the parallel distance between joint1 and joint3, hereafter referred to as Distance and
expressed by Eq. (2), must remain constant, where arm1L and arm2L represent the length of
arm1 and arm2 respectively.
Distance = arm1L * sin∠1 + arm2L * sin∠3

(2)

The constraint on Distance is expressed by Eq. (3), where ∠1‘, and ∠3‘ represent the
measures of the updated angles after the execution of an up-down movement.
arm1L * sin∠1‘ + arm2L * sin∠3‘ = arm1L * sin∠1 + arm2L * sin∠3

(3)

Particularly for the movement of lift, it is apparent that ∠3 must increase on the basis of
this constraint. We have chosen 0.04 radians as an increasing interval unit so that the movement
velocity is moderate, which process is expressed by Eq. (4).
∠3‘ = ∠3 + 0.04 radians

(4)

Now, only the value of ∠1‘ is unknown in Eq. (3), so it is able to be resolved. Finally, the
updated angle of joint2, ∠2‘, is resolved based on Eq. (1); therefore the lift has been
computationally simulated. Similarly, based on Eq. (1), (3), and (5), ∠3 decreases, the movement
of descend has been simulated.
∠3‘ = ∠3 - 0.04 radians
2

(5)

A precondition has been satisfied that the surface a target object stands on, and the surface the robot
stands on are parallel.
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Regarding the back-forth line, as shown in Figure 9 (b), the vertical distance between
joint1 and joint3, hereafter referred to as Height and expressed by Eq. (6), must remain constant.
The constraint on Height is expressed by Eq. (7). Similar to the up-down line, the back-forth
movements extend and back are simulated based on Eq. (1), (7), and (4) or (5) respectively.
Height = arm1L * cos∠1 - arm2L * cos∠3
arm1L * cos∠1‘ - arm2L * cos∠3‘ = arm1L * cos∠1 - arm2L * cos∠3

(6)
(7)

Complicated movements are simulated as well, which extend the basic ones. One of these
complicated movements is to move forward and slightly down; its simulation formula is
developed from the basic movement extend, but instead of being constant, Height needs to
slightly decrease as expressed by Eq. (8), where Height’ represents the measure of the updated
vertical distance between joint1 and joint3. The variable A represents the ratio between Height
and Height’, set to be 0.95 in the simulation.
Height‘ = A * Height

(8)

The constraint on the change in Height is expressed by Eq. (9). Equations (1), (4), and (9)
computationally simulate moving forward and slightly down. Other complicated movements
have been simulated by the same strategy.
arm1L * cos∠1‘ - arm2L * cos∠3‘ = A * (arm1L * cos∠1 - arm2L * cos∠3) (9)
One special case is to carry the hand back to its home position when the target object is
held or the arm is stuck. Because the target position is already known, we just adjust the values
of ∠1 and ∠2 to approximate their target positions within a reasonable interval, such as 0.04
radians; and the value of ∠3 is passively changed according to Eq. (1).
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The simulation of Herbert’s arm controller
We have created a Motor Plan Template (MPT) in a new SMS to model a specific
execution for a grip action inside a LIDA-based software agent. As described in the above
section, this agent involves two types of actuators, the hand and the arm. The hand consists of
two grippers simulating the thumb and the index fingers separately, and the arm, multiple
segments being linearly connected by joints. The action‘s goal is to grip an object in the context
of the current environment. We borrowed the design principles of the arm controller of a robot,
Herbert (Connell, 1989b). Herbert ―… is a completely autonomous mobile robot with an onboard
parallel processor and special hardware support for the subsumption architecture …‖(Brooks et
al., 1988, p. 1). Its arm controller drives the robot to pick a soda can up and bring it back to a
home location (Connell, 1989a).
Computational design
Three types of arm controller components have been modeled: the module (M), the
suppress node (S), and the wire (W). The module is conceptually similar to the Augmented
Finite State Machine (AFSM) used in a standard subsumption architecture (Brooks, 1986),
although they differ in details (Brooks, 1991; Connell, 1989b). Regarding subsumption
architecture‘s two grounding processes, suppress and inhibit, only the suppress node was needed
for Herbert‘s arm controller. Hardware wires are simulated as computational components to link
between modules and suppress nodes. In this way, a module or a suppress node doesn‘t
necessarily have a fixed source or destination; it can be connected later during implementing the
execution for a concrete action. Therefore, these three components are not limited to the
simulation of Herbert‘s arm controller; they can be used to implement other types of
subsumption architecture as well.
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The three components shown in Figure 10 illustrate how they look and their constituent
parts. Each of them has a core routine and I/O methods. The core routine executes as an
independent task, which behaves according to different procedures (algorithms) among the three
different components. The module (M) core routine acts like an AFSM in the subsumption
architecture; it switches among multiple prepared states depending on the current state and the
input sensory data, sending out a motor command when it stays in a certain state. The core
routine in a suppress node (S) exactly simulates the suppress process in the subsumption
architecture; it copies the input data coming through the higher layer to the output if the data is
not empty, otherwise just copies the lower layer‘s data. The wires (W) core routine simply
conveys a data copy from input to output.
A

B
①

②

M

M2

③

②

M1
C

①

S

④

③
W2

M2

S

M1
W1

W3

Figure 10. (A) An example of a module (M), where ② represents the core routine,
while ① and ③ stand for I/O respectively. (B) A suppress node is boxed up by
dotted lines. ③ is the core routine. The remaining parts stand for I/O: the lower and
higher inputs are represented by ① and ② respectively, and ④ is the output. (C)
W1, W2, and W3 are simulated wires linking modules and suppress nodes. A wire‘s
core routine copies the data from input to output.
These core routines are computationally implemented as LIDA-tasks (Snaider et al.,
2011) in the simulated Herbert‘s arm controller. A LIDA-task encapsulates small processes, and
has implemented multithreading support, so that the core routines are able to operate in parallel
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and execute independently. On the other hand, the I/O methods of the components are
implemented by regular programming language methods rather than LIDA-tasks; therefore these
I/O methods need to be invoked by wire components so that the modules and suppress nodes are
linked (see Appendix A for their pseudo codes).
The design of the simulated Herbert‘s arm controller is shown in Figure 11, redrawn from
the original Herbert‘s subsumption diagrams (Connell, 1989b). Sensory data enter from the left;
output commands are sent out on the right. Modules, suppress nodes, and wires are structured
into multiple levels (layers), bottom-up ordered by their priorities. The module name briefly
indicates the associated behavior while in Figure (a), the claw module instructs the fingers to stay
wherever they happen to be, and in Figure (b), the egypt module freezes the arm in whatever
awkward angular configuration it happens to be in at the time (Connell, 1989b). A level‘s name
expresses a behavior-task, also called a competence, which is achieved according to the
combination of its modules and suppress nodes‘ behaviors.
A Grip Motor Plan Template (MPT) was created to maintain these modules, suppress
nodes, wires and their organizations, to simulate Herbert‘s arm controller (see Appendix B for
the simulation‘s software architecture). This Grip MPT is embedded into a newly created SMS
and stored in long-term memory. The SMS receives sensory data from LIDA‘s Sensory Memory
into Grip MPT‘s module components, and also passes the MPT‘s output commands issued by
modules or suppress nodes to the outside, typically the environment in which the LIDA agent
finds itself. At the present time, the MPT implementation is simply based on a robotic Herbert
arm controller: the motor commands inside the MPT are fixedly bound by default values but not
specified at run time, so that the current Grip MPT is conceptually equivalent to a MP as well as
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shown in Figure 3. In accordance with SMS‘s biological inspiration, a specification process will
be added to the MPT in a later implementation, to be described in later.
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Figure 11. Simulated Herbert‘s arm controller consists of (a) hand and (b) arm systems,
redrawn from the original Herbert‘s subsumption diagrams (Connell, 1989b). Compare to
the original diagrams, three changes in the simulation are as described below.
1) In (a), a cradle level was removed. Because the upper bound on force to the actuators
is configured into the simulated environment Webots, the cradle level is unnecessary.
2) In (b), a back module was removed. Since Herbert‘s base controller is not modeled, it
is impossible to simulate an arm rotation to centralize the target object, and thus it is
not necessary to check whether there is a lateral offset between the hand and the
object (the purpose of the back module). We assume the target object is already
centered with respect to the hand.
3) In (b), an edge module was removed because its function was conceptually combined
within the hoist module.
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Experiments
This SMS has been implemented within a LIDA-based software agent. In this section,
two grip experiments from the original Herbert (Connell, 1989b) have been replicated,
investigating the controller‘s reliability and flexibility as shown in Figure 12 and Figure 13,
respectively. The simulation successfully replicates the online control of a grip execution driven
by the simulated Herbert arm controller, lending support to the idea of utilizing the subsumption
architecture as a prototype for an SMS model of the action execution process. Furthermore, we
have reviewed two additional grip experiments to verify the agent‘s proper functioning in a range
of situations.

Figure 12. A composite of the grip trajectories produced by the
simulated arm controller on 10 consecutive runs

First, the results shown in Figure 12 speak to the reliability of simulated controller‘s
behaviors. The lines show the composite trajectories followed by the tips of grippers during 10
consecutive runs of the simulated arm controller. The sequences of gripper tips positions are
recorded by a Supervisor3 in Webots at the run time. During each trial, the hand descends from
point a, and then traverses points b, c, and d exploring for the object: first doing a small bounce
3

The Webots Supervisor "is a privileged type of Robot that can execute operations that can normally
only be carried out by a human operator and not by a real robot‖ (www.cyberbotics.com). It is irrelevant
to the machine learning concept of supervised learning.
84

at point b when it touches the ground surface, and going forward and slightly downward to skim
the surface, then lifting above it and extending when it finds that the object is in front of it. The
grippers reach the object at point e and finally carry it back to point a by performing a ‗hoist‘
task.
During these 10 runs, the agent‘s position changes slightly due to reactive forces
produced by the grippers‘ contact with the ground, and the object; thus, the trajectories are not
exactly same between the runs since they are sensitive to initial conditions such as the agent‘s
position. These differences between the trajectories were not expected in this experiment‘s
design; whereas a realistic robot experiment involves physical noise, our software agent‘s body
and its environment have been deterministically simulated. This unexpected result supports the
existence of an effect originating from within the agent itself, such as its action.
Second, the same controller is used in different environments to verify its flexibility.
Figure 13 (a) shows a trial in which the target object lies on a pedestal rather than directly on the
ground. The hand starts in the same way as in the previous experiment, finds the surface and
begins to skim along it. However, at point c, it detects an object (the pedestal) but fails to grip it.
This attempt results in a tactile input to the agent‘s wrist, activating the task ―uncrash‖.
―Uncrash‖ performs a function similar to ―bounce‖ but for a vertically oriented surface: the
grippers move away from the pedestal and lift (Connell, 1989b). After the grippers are above the
pedestal surface, it executes the remaining portion of the grip action as in the previous case.
Figure 13 (b) shows a case with the target object behind a barrier. Again, the hand
touches the top of the barrier first and then goes forward skimming it. The change of surface is
not noticed by the agent so it proceeds with the rest of the grip as before.
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Figure 13. The simulated arm controller grips an object which is (a) on a
pedestal or (b) behind a barrier.
Besides the replications of the Herbert arm controller experiments, additional
experiments have been performed. Figure 14 (a) shows the same controller gripping a small
object; in this case the agent skims the surface more, but lifts and extends less than when
gripping the taller object (described previously). The skim is achieved by the combination of
multiple ―bounce‖ and ―surface‖ tasks. In Figure 14 (b), no object is available for the hand to
grip. The grippers reach the ground first and then begin to skim along it as in the previous Figure
14 (a); however, no object has yet been found, so the whole arm is stuck at point c for a while,
and after that the grippers are retracted back to point a. The task ―hoist‖ does this retracting the
same as when it carries back a gripped object.

Figure 14. The simulated arm controller (a) grips a small object or (b) fails to grip.
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Biologically Inspired modification
The simulated Herbert arm controller has been modified based on the SMS concept as
described above. Instead of default values, the motor commands inside a MP are bound with
specific command values through a newly created specification process before the action
execution begins, or a new update process at run time; thereby a new grip Motor Plan Template
(MPT) conceptually exists before its motor commands are bound. Two sets of associations are
created. In each of them, a single type of association is implemented, transforming the object‘s
width into a command value—the distance between the grippers, its aperture. Some human
experimental results regarding action execution have been compared with these simulated
results.
First, the grip action is executed using the unmodified arm controller as an experimental
control. As shown in Figure 15 (a), the agent‘s grip aperture is sampled at unit intervals in
Webots virtual time during the grip execution. Whatever its starting value, the grip aperture
almost always reaches 0.0656m (the maximum grip aperture, or MGA) before the grip closes
around the target object. The grippers squeeze the target object, and thus the resulting grip
aperture is smaller than the original target object width.
Second, an association (the upper cylinder in Figure 5) has been implemented by
connecting the sensed object‘s width through the dorsal stream to the value of the grip aperture.
Its transformation formula is expressed by Eq. (10):
Grip aperture = Object‘s width * Magnification – Grippers‘ gap

(10)

The variable Object’s width is a numeric value representing a true width directly sensed
through the dorsal stream from the environment. Magnification is used to set the grip aperture to
be slightly greater than the object width, set to a value of 1.2 in the simulation. A small gap
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between closed grippers is available, which is substituted from the expected grip aperture
(Object‘s width * Magnification) to reach an actual grip aperture necessarily being sent to the
grippers. We are well aware that this formula can be improved in numerous ways, for an
example, using a more complicated formula to represent the Magnification instead of using a
variable only, or including additional parameters. As shown in the experimental results
introducing this section, this simple formula is effective, and we leave for future work the
discovery of various methods for improving it.

Figure 15. The agent‘s grip aperture is sampled at unit intervals in Webots
virtual time during the grip execution.
As shown in Figure 15 (b), the grip aperture typically reaches the specified value of
0.03m before the value falls as the grippers close (see below for an explanation of the two peaks
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in the aperture). Compared to the maximum grip aperture (MGA), which is a fixed aperture
value for Herbert‘s grip, the value specified here is much closer to the target object width of
0.025m. This calibration results from the implementation of the association through the dorsal
stream. This simulated result supports—and is qualitatively the same as saying—that ―the dorsal
stream plays a central role in the programming of actions (i.e. the pre-specification of movement
parameters)‖ (Milner & Goodale, 2008, p. 776), as supported by evidence from observations of
the patient D.F. (James et al., 2003; Milner et al., 1991). The specified value in the simulation is
larger than the object width: 0.03m > 0.025m, since experimentally, ―the finger grip opens more
than required by the size of the object‖ (Jeannerod, 1981, 2006). The first MGA peak is modeled
by setting a fixed MGA value to the grip aperture for a short while when the execution starts, in
keeping with the observed human behavior (Farnè, Pavani, Meneghello, & Làdavas, 2000;
Jeannerod, 2006). The second MGA peak occurs because the grippers touch the surface; the grip
aperture is set to become maximal in this situation so that its behavior can track the object‘s
width value as well as adapt to an unpredicted collision.
Third, another association has been implemented by connecting the object width
represented in the context component of a selected behavior to the value of the grip aperture
(Figure 5, bottom cylinder). Its formula is expressed by Eq. (10) as well, but the variable
Object’s width has a different meaning here. Since the object width represented in the context is
a semantic value, such as ―large‖ or ―small,‖ which are not precise, its value is designed to be
distributed in a range. We simulated this dispersion in the association‘s transformation according
to Eq. (11), where the approximate rate is a random value set to be in a range of 1.0 ~ 1.1 in the
simulation, so that the object width approximates its true value.
Object‘s width = Approximate rate * (True) object‘s width
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(11)

Instead of the data being sensed through the dorsal stream, the selected behavior‘s
context affects the relevant command values in several conditions (Milner & Goodale, 2008).
We simulated two of these conditions: 1) Deleting the association implemented above which
connects the sensed data to the grip aperture; in effect, it makes a skill unfamiliar to the agent, or
2) Terminating the relevant data sensed through the dorsal stream which simulates a delay in the
sensed data. Five executions produced a range of context-specified values rather than a precise
value as shown in Figure 15 (c). We argue that these imprecise movements result from an
association from the selected behavior‘s context to a command value. This interpretation of the
simulation results agrees with the conclusion we reached above that the dorsal stream plays a
central role in specification process. Additional evidence is found in patients suffering from
bilateral optic ataxia caused by damage to the dorsal stream—these patients show deficits in
calibrating their grip aperture (Jakobson, Archibald, Carey, & Goodale, 1991; Jeannerod,
Decety, & Michel, 1994; Milner & Goodale, 2008).
Fourth, an update process is implemented to update the grip aperture values during the
execution. Its formula is expressed by Eq. (10) the same as the association which connects the
sensed object width through the dorsal stream to the grip aperture; however, instead of a constant
value, the Magnification here is set to be dynamically decreasing through the execution time. In
Figure 15 (d), the updated value comes closer to the object width than the specified value; it
follows that the sensed data provided through the update process are more precise than the
context of the specification process, because the situation becomes clearer to the agent as it
executes the action.
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Linking the SMS to LIDA
As discussed above and shown in Table 1, both the data sensed through a dorsal stream
channel, and a selected behavior corresponding to a goal-directed action are input to the SMS,
and the SMS‘s output is sent out to Environment. The grip MPT is mapped one-to-one onto the
action component of a selected grip behavior; this is a simple implementation of MPT selection
following the SMS concept introduced above.
These I/Os are implemented in the LIDA-based agent including the SMS as shown in
Figure 16. Only the related action selection and action execution modules—the latter being
implemented by SMS—are represented. The other LIDA modules are abstractly represented by
LIDA‘s understanding and attention phases.

Figure 16. The SMS is embedded into the LIDA Model
Additionally, in order to let the agent monitor the execution status, an expectation codelet
(Faghihi et al., 2012) is created when the grip behavior is selected in the action selection module;
this particular attention codelet—a small and special purpose computational process—contains
the expected result component of the currently selected behavior. It checks whether this result
has been reached (sensed and recognized by the agent) at run time. The checking result is sent to
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LIDA‘s Global Workspace module, where it competes for the agent‘s attention (Baars, 1988). In
this way, the agent‘s awareness of its own action execution is indirectly achieved.
Four check-points have been set up in the expected result: with the grippers 1) in the
initial situation, 2) in the final situation, 3) holding the target object, and 4) in a stuck situation.
The checked result for these points comes to the attention of the agent if the result wins the
competition during executing the grip action. This means that the agent is aware of some
significant fragments of the action execution, although it has no idea what exactly it is doing in
each moment.
Comparison
We realize that the action process we have developed in LIDA, specifically the action
execution process implemented by the SMS, have the same general form as the action processes
implemented in some of the other architectures, although they use different structures. This
section compares action execution process deployment in three well-known cognitive
architectures—their reviews have been given in Chapter 3 above—to that of LIDA. We argue
that each cognitive architecture having a representation at an explicit level of knowledge, also
needs a process that converts high-level knowledge to motor-level commands, as does the SMS.
ACT-R
Adaptive control of thought-rational (ACT-R) is a cognitive architecture, a theory for
simulating and understanding human cognition based on numerous facts derived from
psychology experiments (http://act-r.psy.cmu.edu/).
ACT-R doesn‘t differ from LIDA very much with respect to action. First, both of their
action processes are conceptually designed with two steps: 1) the selection of a high-level action,
and 2) the execution of low-level actions. In LIDA, a behavior is selected in the action selection
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process based on the agent‘s motivation and its understanding of the current situation. Then in an
action execution process—modeled by the Sensory Motor System (SMS), the behavior‘s action
component is transformed into low-level motor commands that are executed in the real world
through an environment module. Similarly in ACT-R, a production rule is selected and fired in
the production memory, and responds to the patterns of information in the declarative memory
buffers, after which the rule‘s actions request that movements be prepared and executed in the
motor memory. The executed movements then control the devices acting in the world by
utilizing a device module.
Second, the motor control systems of LIDA and ACT-R, the SMS and the motor module
respectively, are structured similarly. In the SMS, a Motor Plan Template (MPT) selection
process acts first, connecting a selected behavior from the action selection process to a MPT
inside the action execution process, and then the ensuing specification process specifies the
values of MPT‘s variables, so that a Motor Plan is created for generating motor commands. In
ACT-R‘s motor module, the preparation process acts first to connect the preceding production
rule‘s action to a certain movement style, such as ‗PUNCH‘ mentioned above, and then to
specify the parameters necessary for the resulting movement execution.
Finally, the low-level actions are modeled with concrete examples of action in both cases:
a grip in LIDA, and the manipulation of virtual keyboard and mouse in ACT-R.
In contrast, there are also several differences between LIDA and ACT-R‘s action
processes. First, in LIDA the MPTs are prepared in advance in long-term memory; the operation
acting on the MPTs is the selection so as to reuse the selected MPT. However in ACT-R, a
movement is specified anew each time in the preparation process; the potential for reuse occurs
only if the movement repeats the previous movement.
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Second, in LIDA‘s SMS, an online control process is implemented, directly connecting
the sensory data to the action execution process during the execution. However in ACT-R, there
is typically no direct communication between the perceptual and motor modules4. The data
passed to the motor module always comes from the high-level declarative memory. This is
almost the only significant conceptual difference between LIDA‘s SMS and ACT-R‘s motor
module.
Soar
Soar is a cognitive architecture in pursuit of general intelligent agents (J. Laird, 2008).
Here we discuss the similarities between the action processes in LIDA and Soar. LIDA has
action selection and action execution processes, while Soar has operator selection and operator
application. Specifically, first, the multiple schemes of LIDA‘s Procedural Memory are recruited
based on the most salient current situation. This recruitment is similar to Soar‘s operator
proposal, in that both provide candidates for the action selection step that follows.
Second, in LIDA, before the process of action selection, recruited schemes are
instantiated into behaviors. Additional information retrieved from the Current Situational Model
is bound to the schemes‘ context and result components, so that actions that are more concrete,
known as behaviors in LIDA, are created. Similarly, Soar‘s elaboration updates the proposed
operators with additional detailed current situation information. Thus, in both cases the candidate
high-level actions undergo an instantiation or elaboration that ―pre-processes‖ them before the
selection process.
Third, the selected behavior‘s action component is executed in LIDA‘s Sensory Motor
System (SMS) by a particular Motor Plan (MP); while in Soar, the actions of the selected
4

There is only very limited direct connectivity between perceptual and motor modules. Spatial
information in particular is communicated directly.
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operator are performed by production rules that match the current situation and the current
operator structure (J. E. Laird et al., 2012).
On the other hand, there are some differences between LIDA‘s action execution and
Soar‘s operator application. We conclude that in the case of Soar‘s output, motor commands,
which cannot be directly performed (executed) on the external world, an external program is
always necessary to handle the final ―real‖ execution (performance) for Soar. In LIDA, however,
its SMS responds by transforming the selected behavior into a sequence of executable motor
commands, presumably in the real world. Note the term ―motor commands‖ expresses
completely different concepts in Soar and LIDA, although it is used to represent the final output
data in both cases. In LIDA, motor commands are executable, while in Soar they are not.
Soar does not cover the representation of implicit environmental information related to
action. This allows it to maintain generality with a clear standard, without the necessity of
considering every possible domain that the Soar agent might live in. In contrast, LIDA
emphasizes the biological viewpoint that an action execution process, which involves the
consideration for domain details, is a reasonable part of an entire cognitive architecture, because
the process of generating executable motor commands are not only driven by the low-level
environmental implicit information but also initiated and affected by the agent‘s high-level
explicit mental processes.
CLARION
CLARION stands for Connectionist Learning with Adaptive Rule Induction ON-line.
The purpose of this architecture is to capture all the essential cognitive processes within an
individual cognitive agent (Sun, 2003, 2006).
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In CLARION, the action process introduced above has many concepts similar to that of
the LIDA Model, though their terminologies and computational representations differ. First, the
sensory data retrieved in LIDA influences the action process at two ―levels‖. At one level,
sensory data is filtered through the understanding and attention phases, and then helps recruit
appropriate actions in the action selection process. At the other level, the data is sensed through a
dorsal stream channel, directly connecting from the Sensory Memory to the action execution
process implemented by the SMS. Similarly in CLARION, the action-centered subsystem (the
ACS) connects the perceptual current state to actions through both the top and bottom levels.
Second, a direct (implicit) mapping from sensory data to action output is modeled in both
LIDA and CLARION. In LIDA‘s SMS, the direct sensory data affects the generation of lowlevel actions. This process is implemented as a Motor Plan (MP) based on the principles of the
subsumption architecture, a reactive structure. One critical feature of the subsumption
architecture is that it doesn‘t maintain any central world state inside5, and is without any explicit
representations. Similarly in CLARION, the ACS‘s bottom level encodes implicit knowledge as
mentioned above, which may be implemented in backpropagation neural networks6, whose
representational units in the hidden layer are capable of accomplishing tasks, but are generally
not individually meaningful (Sun, 2003). Furthermore, the MPT in the SMS and the
backpropagation neural network in the ACS both have the potential for multiple instances, and a
selection process is proposed for both the MPT and the backpropagation neural network.

5

Although no central world state is one of the essences of the subsumption architecture, implicit
understanding and expectation of the environment has been built into the architecture by its layered
structure.
6

There is the learning of implicit knowledge (the backpropagation network) at the bottom level. ―In this
learning setting, there is no need for external teachers providing desired input/output mappings. This
(implicit) learning method may be cognitively justified‖ (Sun, 2006).
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Third, the interaction between the two levels is modeled in both LIDA and CLARION.
The output of LIDA‘s action selection process, known as the selected behavior, is linked to a
MPT, mapping from a semantic action to concrete ones. In CLARION, the input state or the
output action to the bottom level is structured using a number of input or action dimensions; each
of the dimensions has a number of possible values. At CLARION‘s top level, an action rule‘s
condition or action is represented as a chunk node which is connected to all the specified
dimensional values of the inputs or actions at the bottom level (Sun, 2003). CLARION models
an interaction between the top and bottom levels, as well as between explicit and implicit
knowledge.
On the other hand, action processes modeled in LIDA and CLARION are also different.
The two levels of LIDA‘s action process—action selection and action execution—work
interdependently, and operate linearly. A selected behavior, the output of LIDA‘s action
selection, is not executable directly on the environment, but is used to initiate certain processes
operating in the concomitant action execution process, ultimately generating executable lowlevel actions as a sequence of motor commands. However, the two levels implemented in
CLARION‘s ACS operate independently: each of them makes action decisions based on the
current state in parallel. The action sent out from both top and bottom levels are all performable.
The final output action of the ACS is the combination of the output actions from the top and
bottom levels.
Conclusion
Based on the LIDA Model, the subsumption architecture, the two visual systems, as well
certain other cognitive neuroscience hypotheses, the Sensory Motor System (SMS) proposes a
model of the human action execution process.
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In the design of SMS, we have considered the subsumption architecture from a new
viewpoint, namely, that its capabilities fulfill the hypothesis regarding the online control role of
the dorsal stream. Second, we have modified the original subsumption architecture as inspired by
certain hypotheses of cognitive neuroscience so as to combine a reactive structure with a goaldirected action. Finally, we have designed the SMS as a submodule of the systems level
cognitive model LIDA, thereby rendering it capable of communicating with other cognitive
modules naturally in a closed cognitive loop, from sensors to actions.
A computational SMS has been implemented for the execution of a grip behavior, and its
simulated results have been compared to human data. Also, the SMS of LIDA has been
compared to the action processes implemented in three of other cognitive architectures.
This biologically inspired design, together with a computational verification by the
comparison of model and human behaviors, supports the SMS as a qualitatively reasonable
cognitive model for action execution.
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5. Estimating human movements
Introduction
The perceived visual world remains stable during ongoing eye and head movements. Yet
a relatively brief, small, but unexpected visual change in the world may attract our attention
explicitly. Jeannerod considers this stability a paradigm for the distinction between self-produced
and externally produced changes in the world (2006). He argues that ―a displacement of the
visual scene is attributed to an external change, not to a self-produced eye movement.‖ (2006, p.
18)
Jeannerod hypothesized that a functional model, the efference copy (Von Holst &
Mittelstaedt, 1950), disentangles the changes in the world produced by self-movement, from
externally produced changes (2006).
Von Holst and Mittelstaedt hypothesized that each time the motor centers generate an
outflow signal for producing a movement, a copy of this signal (the efference copy) is stored in a
short-term memory. Afterward the relevant reafferent inflow signals—resulting from the
movement and sensed by the agent (Franklin & Graesser, 1997)—are compared with the
efference copy (1950). Note that the comparison is actually between the sensed inflow data and
the desired estimate that is based on the relevant efference copy. If the two correspond, Von
Holst suggests that they would cancel each other out so that there is no inflow data perceived
(1954), a suitable situation for anticipating the sensory effects of a self-produced movement. On
the other hand, if the actual movement departs from the anticipated one, it is likely due to an
external cause (Jeannerod, 2006).
Wolpert and his colleagues (1995) have investigated a sensorimotor integration
mechanism by which people produce an estimate of the result of their movement. They have
hypothesized that the central nervous system (CNS) internally predicts the result of a self99

produced movement by simulating the dynamics of the environment1 using a so-called (forward)
internal model, which is driven by a copy of human motor commands, the efference copy. This
prediction is then combined with a reafferent sensory correction (1995). To test this hypothesis,
they have simulated this prediction and correction using the Kalman filter (Kalman, 1960). In
this way, they qualitatively replicated how humans estimate their hand movements in the dark.
The question of whether combining such an internal model with sensory correction is in
fact neurally implemented in humans, or is just a metaphor for what the human nervous system
does, remains open (Grafton, 2010). However, this model is useful for studying further
hypotheses, including Bayesian decision theory for sensorimotor control (Körding & Wolpert,
2006), optimal feedback control (Todorov & Jordan, 2002), and motor recognition (Jeannerod,
2006). Moreover, the Kalman filter itself has been applied in different domains in other fields,
together with its extended version: extended Kalman filter (EKF) (Auger et al., 2013).
Following the example set by neuroscience researchers (Körding & Wolpert, 2006;
Todorov & Jordan, 2002; Wolpert et al., 1995), we embed estimation into the Sensory Motor
System (SMS) (see Chapter 4 for details) by implementing a Kalman Filter (Kalman, 1960) as
the ―core engine‖ of the forward model‘s estimation process.
In the Kalman Filter, there are two factors that balance the importance between predicted
results and sensory results: the inaccuracy in the knowledge of the dynamics of the environment,
and the noise in the sensory process.
We introduce a third balancing factor, changes in the environmental dynamics. Actually,
humans may experience, and then remember, such changes as a kind of error, the difference
between intended (predicted) results and actual (sensory) results. We propose that this new factor
is driven by memory of errors caused by changes in the dynamics. This idea is inspired by a
1

The environment includes both the agent‘s motor system (body) and the world the agent lives in.
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recent study in sensorimotor learning (Herzfeld et al., 2014). Herzfeld and his colleagues
hypothesize that besides learning from errors, the brain may decide how much to learn from a
given error depending on its memory of errors. These historical errors help humans determine
whether the environment is steady or rapidly changing. Environmental stability thus controls
how much of a given error will be learned so as to affect the estimate of the upcoming
movement.
In the following section we describe and compare the studies of Wolpert et al. (1995) and
Herzfeld et al. (2014). We then introduce our new model, a modified Kalman filter, which
estimates human movements using memory of errors, and go on to describe a computational
experiment that simulates hand lifting action.
Previous Work
In this section we first review a study regarding how people estimate their hand
movements in the dark (Wolpert et al., 1995), and then introduce a recent study about how
memory of errors affects sensorimotor learning (Herzfeld et al., 2014). Finally, we compare the
two studies. In this way, we provide adequate background knowledge to prepare for the
introduction of our new model in the following section.
Simulating a Sensorimotor Integration Process Using the Kalman Filter
Wolpert and colleagues (1995) have argued for the existence of an internal model in the
central nervous system (CNS) that simulates the response of the motor system. They have carried
out a human experiment in which participants move one of their hands horizontally on a plane
either to the left or to the right along one dimension in the dark. In the absence of vision, their
sensory feedback consists only of proprioception during the movement. Participants are
instructed to continue moving until they hear a tone. The timing of the tone is controlled so as to
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produce a uniform distribution in movement duration between 0 and 3 seconds. At the end of
each movement (trial), participants indicate (estimate) the unseen new location of their moved
hand. The difference (error) between participants‘ real and estimated new hand locations is
recorded as a function of movement duration. In total, eight participants performed 300 trials
each. In this experiment, researchers found that on average, 1) participants overestimate their
hand locations—the estimated location is further than the actual—and 2) the error peaks after
one second and then decreases gradually.
As argued by Wolpert et al. (1995), ―these experimental results can be fully accounted for
if we assume that the motor control system integrates the efferent outflow and the reafferent
sensory inflow‖. To support this conclusion, they developed a computational internal model,
with the use of a reafferent sensory correction, to replicate human self-estimation of hand
movements in the dark using a Kalman filter.
The Kalman filter is a recursive algorithm that estimates the state of a discrete-time linear
stochastic system (Kalman, 1960; Maybeck, 1979). It first predicts the system‘s next state in the
timeline, based on its current state, on knowledge of the running system‘s dynamics, and
optionally on its current motor command. Then it corrects the prediction based on sensory data
that may have noise. This two-step routine operates iteratively online to estimate the system‘s
state. From a mathematical viewpoint, the Kalman Filter is a set of equations that provides an
efficient estimate for the state of a process, expressed by Eqs. (12) ~ (16).
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x-t = Ax t-1 + But

(12)

P-t = P t-1 + Q

(13)

Kt = P-t / (P-t + R)

(14)

xt = x-t + Kt(Czt - x-t)

(15)

Pt = (1 - Kt) P-t

(16)

The Kalman Filter‘s prediction process is represented by Eqs. (12) and (13), and its
correction process is represented by Eqs. (14) ~ (16). Variable x represents the state value.
Specifically, xt-1, x-t, and xt represent the immediately previous, intermediate predicted, and
current estimated state values respectively. Variable ut represents the value of input motor
commands, and zt the value of input sensory data. A, B, and C are the parameters for the above
variables. K acts as a gain that weights the new sensory data against the predicted result.
Parameters Q, R, and P represent the uncertainty of the prediction, the correction, and the entire
estimation respectively. For further details, (Kalman, 1960), (Maybeck, 1979), or (Welch &
Bishop, 2006) may be consulted. From one viewpoint, the Kalman filter is a kind of nonMarkovian extension (Thrun, Burgard, & Fox, 2005) because its estimation relies on its
historical data, while optimality is not of concern, and so is not guaranteed in our new model.
Based on the simulated results, Wolpert et al. (1995) have shown that the Kalman filter is
able to qualitatively reproduce the propagation of the error of the estimated hand location as a
function of movement duration.
A Memory of Errors
In the study of sensorimotor learning, Herzfeld and colleagues (2014) have hypothesized
that the brain not only learns from individual errors that it has experienced before, but also
accumulates the errors into a memory; this memory of errors makes it possible for the brain to
control how much it will learn from a given current error.
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Herzfeld et al. (2014) have done human experiments to explore the effect of memory of
errors in human hand-reaching movements. The experimental setup is as follows. (1) A
participant sits down in front of a table, and holds the handle of a robotic arm; the arm is attached
on the table, and its handle can be moved because of several moveable joints in the arm. The
participant is asked to repeatedly make out-and-back reaching movements; the goal for a trial is
to reach a target location from an initial location. (2) The participant‘s hand is occluded by an
opaque horizontal screen that is located above the plane of the forearm; thus the participant
cannot see his hand. (3) An overhead projector displays information on the screen about the
actual hand location, the initial location, and the intended target location of the reach. This
information is visually available to the participants. (4) During a reaching movement (only on
the outward reach), the participant‘s hand may be perturbed by the robotic arm through its handle
with a force perpendicular to the reaching direction. The perturbation produces an error during
the reaching movement, the difference between the intended hand location and the actual hand
location upon arriving. (5) The magnitude of the perturbing force is constant, and the direction
may be either to the left or to the right. Thus the force may create two types of errors.
Using this experiment, Herzfeld et al. examine the relationship between memory of
errors, and the amount that is learned from a given error. They hypothesize as follows:
―[Consider] an environment in which the perturbations persist from trial to trial, and another
environment in which the perturbations switch … In a slowly switching environment, the brain
should learn from error because the perturbations are likely to persist (learning from error in one
trial will improve performance on the subsequent trial). However, in a rapidly switching
environment, the brain should suppress learning from error because any learning will be
detrimental to performance on subsequent trials‖ (Herzfeld et al., 2014).
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In the experiment, participants are randomly divided by environmental stability into three
groups (9 per group): they first performed 30 trials of reaching in either a slowly, medium-speed,
or rapidly switching environment—the direction of the perturbing force switches. And then all
participants experience a pure reaching movement without any perturbation for 10 trials 2; in this
way, the effects of the perturbation are removed. Finally, all participants experience one reaching
trial with the same perturbation.
The researchers measured the change in the force applied by participants before and after
the final perturbation. By considering the force produced by a participant, a proxy for the
participant‘s estimate of the perturbing force, they can indirectly measure how much the
participant‘s estimate of the perturbing force has been updated after experiencing a perturbation.
They found that the responses of participants to the same perturbation are different between
groups. A participant gives larger responses—corresponding to a higher estimate of the force—
in the slowly switching environment and smaller responses—indicating a lower estimate of the
force—in the rapidly switching environment. This phenomenon supports their hypothesis quoted
above.
Note that in this experiment, although the memory of perturbation has been removed
using 10 trials of pure reaching movements before measuring the effect of the final perturbation,
a more abstract attribute of the environment, corresponding to a level of persistence of the
environment—environmental stability, is still available in the memory, and thus influences the
effect of the final perturbation. A term ―saving‖ names the influence of this available abstract
attribute.

2

This pure reaching movement is known as a ―washout‖ (Herzfeld, Vaswani et al. 2014).
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Comparisons between the Two Studies
In this subsection, we compare the two studies reviewed above. To conserve words, we
cite the two papers (Herzfeld et al., 2014; Wolpert et al., 1995) for the two studies respectively in
the whole subsection here, and at times below we simply refer to the study of Wolpert et al.
(1995) as the first study and to the study of Herzfeld et al. (2014) as the second study.
First, in both studies, researchers investigate the process by which humans produce an
estimate of their movement. Wolpert and colleagues simulate how people estimate, using the
Kalman filter, how their hand moves in the dark, and Herzfeld and colleagues propose a causal
relationship from memory of errors to the knowledge of the environmental dynamics, which
knowledge affects the estimation of upcoming movements.
However, the estimation processes examined in the two studies are at different levels.
Wolpert and colleagues study the estimated hand location within a single movement trial. They
calculated the propagation of estimation error on average for one movement, while they did not
concern themselves with the relationships between multiple movement trials. On the other hand,
Herzfeld and colleagues study the estimated hand location between trials. They proposed the
hypothesis regarding the effect of historical movements on the estimation of the current
movement. But we still consider these two studies comparable, because in fact, they are
qualitatively studying the same thing, how humans estimate their movements. From this
viewpoint, it is reasonable to borrow ideas from the second study to modify the simulation
implemented in the first study.
Second, in both studies, an update process relying on an error—the difference between
predicted (intended) results and sensory (actual) results—is used in the process of producing the
estimate of movements. In the first study, the predicted result is corrected using sensory results.
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A parameter K is used to weight the effect of the error in this correction (see Eq. (15)). The value
of K depends on both the inaccuracy of the knowledge of the environmental dynamics, and the
noise in the sensory process (see Eq. (14)). In the second study, a memory of errors controls
(weights) how much the current error will be used for updating the newly estimated result, the
magnitude of a type of learning rate. Here we see that in the first study, there are two factors—
the inaccuracy and the noise—that weight the error, and in the second study, a third factor—
memory of errors—is used.
A Model That Estimates Human Movements Using Memory of Errors
In this section, we first propose an operational definition for a learning rate η that
determines how memory of errors functionally controls the extent to which errors will be
learned. This definition is conceptually inspired by the work of Herzfeld et al. (2014). Then we
introduce a modified Kalman filter, in which we add a new factor—memory of errors—to
balance the importance between predicted results and sensory results. The effect of this new
factor is represented by the magnitude of the learning rate η. In this way, we achieve a new
model that is able to reflect its knowledge of memory of errors—a feature of the environmental
dynamics—into the process of producing movement estimates. Finally, we add this estimation
model, which is implemented by the modified Kalman filter, to the Sensory Motor System
(SMS).
The Learning Rate η
The magnitude of the learning rate (η) is controlled by memory of errors. The specific
formula for this control is represented as a sigmoid function expressed by Eq. (17), and which is
assisted by Eq. (18). The learning rate ranges from 0.5 to 1.5 with a default value of 1.0.
(17)
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t = 1.0 –

if n ≠ 0, and t = 0 if n = 0

(18)

Specifically in Eq. (17), the variable t represents the status of the memory of errors,
which is calculated according to Eq. (18). It ranges from -1.0 to 1.0. The parameter θ tunes the
effect of t, and is set to 6.0 by default. In Eq. (18), the variable n represents how many errors
have been experienced by the brain, and thus stored in the memory. Variable n is an integer
starting from zero.
As mentioned in above, the forces of perturbations used in the study of Herzfeld et al.
(2014) have the same magnitude with directions either to the left or to the right. Similarly, we set
only two types of errors in our model: the same magnitude with either positive or negative sign.
Variable s represents how many times the error type has switched within the memory of errors.
Variable s is an integer starting from zero.
Here we explain the behavior of the above formula with examples. If the brain has
experienced many errors and most of them have the same sign, the value of n is large and the
value of s is small; therefore, the value of t is large, close to 1, so that the value of θt is close to
6.0 and η is close to 1.5. This means a slowly switching environment results in a high learning
rate—learning more from the current error. On the other hand, if there are many errors in
memory and they have switched signs very often, the values of both s and n are large, so t is
negative with a large absolute value; thus the value of η is close to 0.5. This means a rapidly
switching environment leads to a low learning rate—learning less from the current error. These
simulated behaviors qualitatively agree with the hypothesis proposed by Herzfeld et al. (2014).
Note that when there is no error in the memory yet, the value of t is 0 because n is 0, so the value
of η is 1.0, which is considered the default value of η.
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A Modified Kalman Filter
Compared to the original Kalman filter expressed by Eqs. (12) ~ (16), we modified Eq.
(15) by adding a new variable η, which is defined in above sections, as expressed by Eq. (19).
The newly modified Kalman filter is expressed by Eqs. (12)~(14), (16), and (19).
xt = x-t + ηKt(Czt - x-t)

(19)

The added variable η represents a new factor that balances the importance between
predicted results and sensory results, occurring together with the parameter K.
Two questions need answering regarding this modified Kalman filter: does this
modification make sense, and what is its benefit? For the first question, as we have discussed
above, both of the studies (Herzfeld et al., 2014; Wolpert et al., 1995) introduce a process that
updates the movement estimate using a given error, the difference between predicted and sensory
results. Although the two updating processes are in different granularity: to update the estimate
within one movement trial or between trials, they conceptually produce the same thing. A
parameter has been used to weight the error in each of the updating processes: a Kalman gain K
in the Kalman filter, and a learning rate η described above. Because η has a nature that K does
not have—the representation of the effect of memory of errors—it is reasonable to add η into the
Kalman filter to weight the error together with K.
Second, the major benefit of adding the parameter η is to handle more cases—allowing us
to simulate more human behaviors using memory of errors; the original Kalman filter uses only
the previous estimate to make the current estimate. The modified Kalman filter has both
inherited the capabilities of the original Kalman filter (Wolpert et al., 1995) that simulates the
estimation process within a single trial of movement, and obtained a new way to weight the error
for updating the estimate of movements (Herzfeld et al., 2014), so as to simulate the estimation
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between movement trials. In the following section, we examine the capabilities of the modified
Kalman filter by implementing it into a simulated lifting movement.
Adding an Estimation Process into the SMS
As shown in Figure 17, the original SMS generates low-level motor commands to
actuators within the environment. It is driven by 1) a high-level goal-directed action provided by
LIDA‘s Action Selection module, and 2) the sensory data perceived from LIDA‘s Sensory
Memory. We added an estimation process into the SMS of LIDA to implement our modified
Kalman filter. The inputs to this estimation process comprise a copy of motor commands (the
efference copy) together with real sensory data. The newly added estimation process in the SMS
provides estimated sensory data to the SMS‘s original ―motor command generation‖ component.
Inside this new process, we implement two sub-modules, an internal model and a correction
process, which accomplish the prediction and correction steps of the modified Kalman filter
respectively. The above Eqs. (12)~(14), (16), and (19) explain detailed computational
expressions of the prediction and correction steps.
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Figure 17. An estimation process in the Sensory Motor
System (SMS) of LIDA

110

We have observed that the motor commands sent out to the actuators need time to be
executed, which means that at a given time, the motor commands and the sensory data input into
the estimation process may not be consistent. To deal with this, we have created a FIFO (First In
First Out) queue for storage of the input motor commands in the internal model and set the
queue‘s length to one. Thus, there is a one-step delay between the motor commands and the
current sensory data used for the estimation.
Experiments
In this section, we test the performance of the estimation process of our newly proposed
model in a simulated hand lifting action, by comparing its estimation process with human
behaviors reported from two previous studies (Herzfeld et al., 2014; Wolpert et al., 1995). The
comparison results support our new model‘s ability to simulate the estimation process not only
within one trial of the movement but also between trials using memory of errors.
Experimental Setup
From recent reviews of the study of human hand-lifting movement (Johansson &
Flanagan, 2009; Wolpert et al., 2011), we see that some researchers (Berner, SchönfeldtLecuona, & Nowak, 2007; Flanagan, Bittner, & Johansson, 2008; Jenmalm, Schmitz, Forssberg,
& Ehrsson, 2006) have supported the existence of a (forward) internal model occurring during
lifting. They hypothesize that people predict their lifting movements based on a system that
simulates the behavior of their body and their environment (Wolpert et al., 2011), and ―the CNS
signals the sensory discrepancy between the predicted and actual sensory consequences of
action‖ (Jenmalm et al., 2006). These hypotheses have led us to choose lifting as a reasonable
target movement to which to apply our model to simulate the human movement estimation
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process, because the hypotheses support the primary mechanism of our model, a modified
Kalman filter.
We use a software robot simulation (youBot), a robot controller (the LIDA Framework
(Snaider et al., 2011)), and a virtual experimental environment (Webots (www.cyberbotics.com))
to simulate a lifting movement. We consider this robotic simulation to be a LIDA-based software
agent. The LIDA Framework, youBot, and Webots have been introduced in detail in sections
4.4.1 and 4.4.2 above. Here we present only a screenshot of the LIDA-based agent lifting an
object (Figure 18), so as to give an intuitive feel for the agent and its action. Specifically, in our
experiment lifting refers to an action in which the agent grips an object, and moves it upwards.
The gripper tip locations serve as the hand locations.

Figure 18. A screen shot of a LIDA-based agent lifting an object
We implement our new model into the Sensory Motor System (SMS) of LIDA. In the
LIDA Framework‘s Environment module (see Figure 1), we have added noise to joints 1 ~ 3 (see
Figure 8) by randomly setting their angles with a normal distribution: the mean is the actual
measure of the angle, and the STD is 0.1 degrees. In this way, uncertain sensory data is sent to
the estimation process. We use the added process to estimate the youBot‘s finger positions
during executing an action in the above uncertain situation.
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Implementation of the Learning Rate η
As defined above, the value of η depends on both the number of historical errors and the
switching time between these errors. Computationally, we created three variables stored in longterm memory: (1) the number of errors n, (2) the number of switches s, and (3) the current error
type c. The first two variables n and s have been introduced in above sections. Variable c is used
to determine whether the current error and the upcoming error have different types. If the two
errors have different types, one instance of error-switching will be accumulated to variable s;
otherwise the value of s does not change.
In the experiment, these three variables are retrieved once when the agent initializes a
lifting movement; thus, the value of η is calculated before the start of the movement and is
constant within one trial. Then, at the end of every lifting trial, the three variables are updated
based on the error between the estimated hand location and the actual hand location. In this way,
the value of η may change between trials.
Estimation without Memory of Errors
We prepare a computational experiment that is configured similarly to the human
experiment reported earlier (Wolpert et al., 1995), which studies the estimation process within a
single movement trial without being concerned about memory of errors.
As we have reviewed above, in the study of Wolpert and colleagues (1995), human
participants are asked to move their hand in dark, and they stop moving and report an estimated
hand location when they hear a tone. In our simulation, the agent does not have visual sensors
but senses the angles of its arm‘s joints; this configuration conforms to the situation in the human
experiment, namely, that participants are without vision, and guided solely by proprioception.
Also, we created a program that sends a stop command to the agent, instructing it to stop lifting.
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This program plays the role of ―the experimenters‖ who control the timing of the tone in the
human experiment. In the human case, a pair of real and estimated hand locations was collected
at the end of each movement trial. So in total, 2400 data pairs were collected (eight participants
with 300 trials each). In our simulation, the ―experimenter‖ program generates one stop
command at a different virtual time3 during each lifting trial. Stop commands are generated so as
to give a range of lift durations from 6 to 65 units over 60 lifting trials. We consider the process
during the first 5 time units to be the system‘s initiation process, and did not collect data during
this interval. We performed 40 repetitions of the above trial block (60 lifting trials with different
durations) for a total of 2400 data pairs of estimated hand location and actual location, in order to
achieve parity with the data collected during the human experiment.
On the agent‘s side, first it senses the stop command from its environment as an input to
its Sensory Memory; and then this command is sent to the Current Situational Model (CSM) as
part of the agent‘s current understanding of the environment. The command is represented as a
stop node in the CSM. A special Attention Codelet is implemented to attend to this stop node,
and form it into a special data structure, a coalition (Baars, 2002; Franklin et al., 2014), sending
the coalition then to the Global Workspace (GW). In the GW, the coalition containing the stop
node might win a competition among different coalitions, and thus be broadcast to the rest of the
system as the conscious content. There are multiple schemes stored in Procedural Memory (PM),
which are able to be instantiated to behaviors. We prepared a special scheme that (1) will be
recruited by the arrival of the stop node in the conscious content, and (2) contains an action
component for executing a stop command. Then when the stop node comes through the
conscious content to PM, this scheme is chosen and instantiated into a behavior that has an

3

The agent executes at unit intervals in Webots virtual time.
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action component for stop. Finally when this behavior arrives at the Sensory Motor System
(SMS), the currently running lifting movement is stopped.
In our simulation, the differences (errors) between real and estimated hand locations are
recorded as a function of the duration of the hand lifting movement. The average error for each
moment (virtual time unit) is calculated, and is shown in Figure 19; movement duration is
represented as a number of virtual time units. These simulated results are qualitatively similar to
the human data (Wolpert et al., 1995): Overall, 1) the hand location is overestimated, and 2) the
error peaks in the first part of the movement (at virtual time 23), and then goes down.
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Estimation with Different Memory of Errors
In this sub-section, we describe a computational experiment to examine the effect of
memory of errors on the estimation process of an agent. This effect has been examined in, and
supported by, human experiments (Herzfeld et al., 2014).
In our experiment, the agent may lift three types of objects, which have different weights:
0.1kg, 0.2kg, or 0.3kg. We consider 0.2kg to be the default weight, and 0.1kg to be lighter and
0.3kg to be heavier. To artificially create errors as those that were introduced in the human
experiments (Herzfeld et al., 2014), we first configure the agent‘s knowledge of the object‘s
weight to a default value (0.2kg), and then let the agent lift either a lighter (0.1kg) or a heavier
object (0.3kg). In this way, the difference (error) occurs between the estimated hand location and
the actual one, and two types of errors, positive or negative, are made by using lighter or heavier
objects respectively.
Based on the fact that the sequence of errors stored in memory may switch between
positive and negative, we prepare five types of environment that the agent can experience: error
switching rates of 10%, 30%, 50%, 70%, or 90% respectively.
To observe the effect of memory of errors, we first let the agent perform 30 lifting trials,
using either lighter or heavier objects, to create its memory of errors, and then we let it do one
lifting trial using a heavier object. We analyze the propagation of simulated estimation errors
during the last lifting trial when the agent has experienced a certain type of environment. In
detail, we let the agent perform the above 31 trials 25 times for each type of environment, and
calculated the estimation errors on average during the 31st trial, as shown in Figure 20. Within
every 31 trials, the value of η changes (see Sections 5.3.1 and 5.4.2), and its value is initialized to
zero when the agent starts a new sequence of 31 trials. The approach we are using here to
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explore the effect of memory of errors is based on the design of previous human experiments
(Herzfeld et al., 2014).
As shown in Figure 20, the simulated estimation errors are different in different
environments. In detail, the errors are smaller when the environment the agent has experienced
has a lower switching rate of errors—propagation (a) is largest and (e) is smallest; that is, the
error propagation peak is lower, and the decline after the peak is more rapid. This difference
demonstrates that when the environment is more stable—having lower error switching rate—the
estimated hand location is closer to the actual because the agent learns more from a given error
created using a heavier object. This effect of the environment (memory of errors) matches the
phenomenon found in the human experiment (Herzfeld et al., 2014). In more detail, the value of
η is different while generating propagations of simulated estimation errors ((a) ~ (e)). For
example, in situation (a), the agent experiences a rapidly changing environment (switching rate
of 90%), so in Eq. (18) variable s is close to n, and then together with Eq. (17) the value of η
nearly reaches its minimum, 0.5. On the other hand, in situation (e), because the agent
experiences a very steady environment (switching rate of 10%), we can infer that the value of η
nearly reaches its maximum, 1.5. Similar computational inferences can be done for situations (b)
~ (d) as well. These inferences match the interpretation of Herzfeld and his colleagues for the
human results (2014). Therefore, we argue that we have simulated both the phenomenon and
causal factors present in certain human experiments (Herzfeld et al., 2014).
Furthermore, for most propagations of simulated estimation errors shown in Figure 20,
from (b) through (e), their behaviors are similar to study results of human behavior (Wolpert et
al., 1995): 1) the hand location is overestimated, and 2) the error peaks in the first part of the
movement, and then goes down. The only exception is the propagation (a) in Figure 20, which
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does not exactly follow the human experimental result (Wolpert et al., 1995): although it shows
the overestimation of the hand location, its error simply goes up but does not have an ensuing
decline. We think this exception may be due to the fact that the 90% switching rate is an extreme
situation that is outside the scope of the hypothesis (Wolpert et al., 1995) describing usual human
behavior. In this situation, the agent has experienced a very rapidly changing environment, so it
almost does not believe the current sensed data—the agent‘s knowledge dominates the
estimation. That is why the decline does not appear after the peak, and the decline is the result of
a trade-off between the agent‘s knowledge of the dynamics of the environment and its sensory
data.
In summary, together with the experimental results shown above, we have shown that an
agent embedded with our newly proposed model is able to simulate both (1) human estimation of
its lifting movement within one trial (Wolpert et al., 1995), and (2) human estimation between
lifting trials driven by memory of errors (Herzfeld et al., 2014).
5.5 Conclusion
We have presented a new model that estimates human movements using memory of
errors. Furthermore, we have computationally embedded this model into a cognitive model,
LIDA (Franklin et al., 2014), to simulate human self-estimation of their movements.
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6. Modeling Sensorimotor Learning in LIDA
Introduction
We studied the term ―sensorimotor‖ from the concept of cognitive development proposed
by Jean Piaget (Piaget, Brown, & Thampy, 1985; Pulaski, 1980). As he reported, when an infant
was in his first two years of life, within the so-called ―sensorimotor stage,‖ the infant builds a
mental mechanism for its overall interaction with the environment. This building process results
from several inherited elements, as well as his experience interacting with the environment over
time. In our view, we consider this mental mechanism the infant‘s initial mind, and we think
there is a kind of sensory motor system acting in the mind for the control of such behavioral
interactions. As the infant progresses to the higher cognitive developmental stages, more
complex mental processes and representations emerge, and the sensory motor system integrates
with them while continuing to handle the interaction with the environment. In a mature human‘s
mind, the sensory motor system cooperates with other parts of mind, and directly interacts with
the environment.
In a recent review in neuroscience (Wolpert et al., 2011), the authors argued that there are
different task components necessary for motor learning, including relevant information
gathering, selection of strategies, and both predictive and reactive (motor) control mechanisms.
Furthermore, different learning processes are necessary to be applied on these components.
These necessities have been conceptually fulfilled in a cognitive architecture, LIDA.
We present a new model of sensorimotor learning in LIDA using the concept of
reinforcement learning. This is the second implementation of learning in LIDA, the first being
the modeling of attentional learning by Faghihi and colleagues (2012). The new model stores and
updates the rewards of pairs of data, motor commands and their contexts, using the concept of
reinforcement learning; thus the agent is able to generate (output) effective commands in certain
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contexts based on its reward history. Following Global Workspace Theory, the primary basis of
LIDA, the process of updating rewards in sensorimotor learning is cued by the agent‘s conscious
content, the most salient portion of the agent‘s understanding of the current situation, issued by
the Global Workspace module of LIDA.
Furthermore, researchers in neuroscience have recently proposed that the brain maintains
a memory of errors in sensorimotor learning, and they found that during a motor task, ―the brain
controls how much it is willing to learn from the current error through a principled mechanism
that depends on the history of past errors‖ (Herzfeld et al., 2014). Here the error is the difference
between the brain‘s predicted result and the sensory result. These researchers proposed a
concept, called error sensitivity (Herzfeld et al., 2014) or learning rate (Gonzalez Castro,
Hadjiosif, Hemphill, & Smith, 2014), to represent the percentage of error that will be added to
the predicted results during its updating.
The researchers found that the brain controls this error sensitivity depending on the
error‘s history (Herzfeld et al., 2014). The brain learns more from the errors—error sensitivity
becomes high—when their histories are likely to persist, and it learns less—error sensitivity
becomes low—when the histories were likely to change. ―Persistent errors‖ refers to those
historical errors that have the same sign, either both positive or both negative. Another relevant
work has been reported for the dynamic regulation of reinforcement learning parameters as well
(Khamassi, Enel, Dominey, & Procyk, 2013). In their work, the learning rate is dynamically
tuned as a function of the environment's volatility. In our view, the environment‘s volatility
(uncertainty) is similar to the error sensitivity introduced above, a kind of environment‘s
stability. Inspired by these hypotheses, we introduce the effect of memory of errors into the
newly added learning mechanism, so as to implement a dynamic learning rate.
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In the next section, we introduce the work of modeling sensorimotor learning in LIDA.
Then in the following section, we describe an addition of a dynamic learning rate into this
learning mechanism. Following that, we provide current experimental results. Finally, we
conclude the work and propose some directions for further research.
Modeling Sensorimotor Learning in LIDA
Practically it is easy to study this modeling work by using an example that includes
concrete motor commands. Therefore, we simulated an autonomous agent (Franklin & Graesser,
1997) to implement our model of sensorimotor learning. The agent consists of a simulated robot
body and a controller implemented using the computational LIDA framework (Snaider et al.,
2011). This agent is designed to learn how to push a box properly.
Below we introduce the robot, the cooperation between the Sensory Motor System (SMS)
and some of LIDA‘s other modules, the development of the new SMS, and the implementation
of other relevant LIDA modules.
A Box Pushing Robot
We reuse a two-wheeled robot provided by Webots, as shown in Figure 21. Its simulated
height is 0.08m and its radius is 0.045m. The motor commands of the robot are limited to going
forward, and turning left or right either by approximately 13 or 22 degrees.

Figure 21: A two-wheeled box pushing robot
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The robot has eight distance sensors. Each of these sensors has a field of view of about 15
degrees, and can detect objects within 0.3m. We simplified the sensors to detect objects in two
distance ranges, one from 0m to 0.15m (NEAR) and the other from 0.15m to 0.25m (FAR).
These sensors are arranged in an orthogonal pattern, with four on the front and two on each side.
In addition, a touch sensor is placed on the robot‘s front to detect a bump, and another sensor
built inside the robot‘s body detects when the robot becomes stuck—the sensor senses the
agent‘s location and rotation; it is activated when the agent‘s location and rotation are the same
during two consecutive sensory cycles.
The Cooperation between the SMS and Some Other LIDA Modules
There are two LIDA modules, Action Selection and Sensory Memory (see Figure 1), that
provide relevant information as separate inputs to the SMS. The SMS sends out motor
commands as its output to the environment. The output of the SMS also modulates other parts of
LIDA. The LIDA-based agent is an autonomous agent that senses the effects of its own previous
output (motor commands), which influence other modules in LIDA.
We implemented a broadcasting channel from LIDA‘s Global Workspace (GW) to the
SMS (Sensory Motor Memory in Figure 1), sending the agent‘s conscious content to the SMS.
The arrival of this content cues (initializes) the update of the rewards to motor commands in the
SMS so as to assign credit to effective commands. Note that the conscious content does not
directly provide the rewards, but it leads to the process of making and then updating the rewards.
This is in keeping with GWT, in which the conscious content broadcast from the GW modulates
learning in the rest of the system.
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The Development of the SMS
The SMS is the key module that was augmented when we implemented a model of
sensorimotor learning into LIDA. Prior this addition, motor commands were built into a
mechanism (subsumption architecture style) implemented in the SMS, and could not be changed
at runtime. Now, the sensorimotor learning implemented into LIDA leads to a dynamic selection
of motor commands at runtime based on the newly experienced rewards to the commands. Our
computational design is inspired by Mahadevan and Connell‘s previous work (1992). They
added a learning aspect into the traditional subsumption architecture using the idea of
reinforcement learning (Kaelbling, Littman, & Moore, 1996). We improved theirs in two primary
ways: 1) we imbued the original learning with a more biologically inspired interpretation by
bringing it into LIDA to implement sensorimotor learning—basically in LIDA, the arrival of new
conscious content issued from the Global Workspace module cues the creating and updating of
rewards in the SMS, and 2) we implemented a new mechanism to control the rate of learning
(see this in the below section later).
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Figure 22: The design of a new SMS
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The design of the new SMS is shown in Figure 22. Compared to its previous version, we
have added three new components: (1) a set of reward updating processes, (2) a set of rewards
databases, and (3) a set of errors databases. We introduce the first two components and the SMS
for modeling sensorimotor learning below, and leave the introduction of the errors databases for
adding a dynamic learning rate to the following section. In brief, the rewards database maintains
the reward values, while the errors database stores the history of reward prediction errors. Note
that in our work, the term error does not mean a ―punishment‖, the opposite of a reward; rather
an error here refers to the difference between the currently stored rewards and newly generated
rewards.
In Figure 22, the SMS contains a (motor) command generation module depicted in the
upper part of the diagram and a long-term memory, Sensory Motor Memory (SMM), depicted in
the bottom part. The command generation module responds to the execution of a selected
behavior. That behavior results from the preceding Action Selection Module on the right, and
acts to specify a desired action in LIDA. General details about the behavior data structure can be
found in (Franklin et al., 2014). In our case, the selected behavior is pushing a box. On the left
side of this module, a reactive motor control mechanism—a kind of subsumption architecture—
is built in. The structure of the mechanism implements a priority network that imposes an order
on the three sub-tasks of box pushing. The unwedger‘s behavior suppresses the pusher‘s, and
both of these suppress the finder‘s. A suppression operation is represented by an encircled
uppercase S in the network diagram. Briefly, the agent begins by finding and closing a box, it
then continuously pushes the box, and finally the agent can ―unwedge‖ itself if it becomes stuck.
These subtasks are implemented by finite state machines (FSMs), which are driven by the
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current state of the environment sensed through the Sensory Memory (SM), and which may in
certain states send out motor commands to the environment.
Because of the implemented sensorimotor learning, the motor commands sent out from
the FSM can now be dynamically chosen at runtime based on their rewards. Each FSM has its
own rewards database maintained in SMM. Another part of learning is a set of reward updating
processes, which are depicted on the right side of the command generation module. These
processes are driven by the conscious content broadcast from LIDA‘s Global Workspace (GW),
and each of them one-to-one updates the reward values stored in a rewards database for a certain
FSM.
The algorithm of the reward updating process is inspired by Q-Learning (Watkins, 1989);
this updating helps the agent propagate rewards in the time line. The reward update formula (see
Eq. (20)) uses a reward function Q(x, m) across states (x) and motor commands (m). This reward
function is defined by Q(x, m) = r + ϒE(y), where r is the immediate reward, and E(y) is the
expected reward of the state y resulting from the command. E(y) is the maximum Q(y, m) over
all commands m. ϒ is a discount parameter that is set to 0.9, which determines the importance of
future rewards. Its current value 0.9 is supported by Mahadevan and Connell‘s experimental
results (1992).
Q(x, m)  Q(x, m) + β(r + ϒE(y) – Q(x, m))

(20)

During updating, since the current stored reward Q(y, m) has not yet converged to the
updated value—r + ϒE(y)—the difference between them then provides the reward error in the
current stored rewards. This error is used to update the stored rewards using a learning rate β.
Currently, the value of β is set to 0.5 as supported by Mahadevan and Connell‘s experimental
results (1992); but we will replace it using a dynamic learning rate mechanism described below.
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In Eq. (20), immediate rewards (r) are calculated differently depending on the FSMs‘
behavior (see Figure 22). First, for finding a box, the agent is rewarded by +3 if it detects an
object in its front NEAR zone during forward movement, or it is punished by -1 if no object is
there. The default reward is 0 if the agent is not moving forward. Second, for pushing a box, the
agent is rewarded by +1 if it is touching an object during its forward motion, or it is punished by
-3 if not touching. The default reward is 0 as before. Finally, for getting unwedged, the agent is
punished by -3 if it is wedged while moving forward, or it is rewarded by +1 if no wedging
occurs. The default reward is 0 if the agent is neither wedged nor moving forward.
When a FSM chooses its current command, in 90% of the time, given the same current
state, the motor command that has maximum reward values is chosen. In the remaining 10% of
cases, a motor command is randomly chosen. Choosing commands only based on their rewards
will never allow the exploration of new commands or new states. Sometimes, a random
command is chosen to ensure that all states in the state space will eventually be explored.
Suggested by Mahadevan and Connell (1992), 10% is a good compromise between exploratory
and goal-directed activity, in line with their experimental results.
Implementation of Other Relevant LIDA Modules
We implemented several other relevant LIDA modules appropriate for the specification
of learning a box pushing task using sensorimotor learning. We list the implementation of each
module below, ordered according to the three phases of the LIDA cognitive cycle:
understanding, attention, and action/learning. Figure 1 gives an intuitive feel for the relationship
of these modules. Details of these modules can be found in (Franklin et al., 2014).
Sensory Memory (SM)
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SM gets sensory data from environment, structured as an array of Boolean bits,
representing the data status sensed from each of the sensors, either active or inactive. SM
provides the SMS with the current data.
Feature detectors (FDs) and Perceptual Associative Memory (PAM)
PAM stores a set of nodes, each of them representing a specific aspect of an
environmental state of concern to the agent. In our work, these nodes are distance nodes
including NEAR and FAR, a bumping node, and a stuck node. FDs constantly obtain the current
state from the SM, activating relevant nodes in PAM.
The Current Situational Model (CSM) and structure building codelets (SBCs)
The CSM receives currently activated nodes from PAM, and builds the agent‘s
understanding of the current situation. SBCs reorganize data in the CSM, combining sets of
nodes and links into node/link structures. They build an agent‘s higher level understanding of the
current situation.
Attention codelets and the Global Workspace (GW)
We added an attention codelet concerned for the entire current situation in the CSM, and
bringing it into the GW. In the GW, the current situation may win the competition to produce the
agent‘s conscious content. A channel from the GW to the SMS—newly implemented this time—
broadcasts the conscious content to other modules including the SMS.
Procedural Memory (PM)
Following the broadcast of conscious content from the GW, a box pushing scheme is
recruited in the PM, and then a relevant behavior is instantiated that is selected by the Action
Selection module and sent to SMS, which initiates a motor command generation mechanism for
executing the box pushing in the SMS.
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A Dynamic Learning Rate in Sensorimotor Learning
In a study of sensorimotor learning, Herzfeld and colleagues (2014) have hypothesized
that the brain not only learns from individual errors that it has experienced before, but also
accumulates the errors into a memory; this memory of errors makes it possible for the brain to
control how much it will learn from a given current error. These historical errors help humans
determine whether the environment is steady or rapidly changing. Environmental stability thus
controls how much of a given error will be learned so as to affect the prediction of the upcoming
movement. This study has been described in detail in the previous sections.
We interpret the above hypothesis as a computational mechanism. In the mechanism,
memory of errors controls the value of a ―learning rate‖, which weights the amount of an error—
typically the difference between sensory (actual) result and predicted (intended) result—that will
be used in an update process of the predicted result.
In the work of modeling sensorimotor learning as described above, one step in updating
the reward of motor commands is to learn from the reward error as expressed by Eq. (20). We
consider this reward updating process to be similar to the update process mentioned in the above
mechanism. Therefore, here we revise Eq. (20) by changing the quality of its parameter β from a
constant value to a dynamic value. Now the value of parameter β will be controlled by memory
of errors as introduced above (Herzfeld et al., 2014).
Note that the reward of motor commands manipulated in our development of
sensorimotor learning is different than the execution result (the movement) of motor commands
discussed by those neuroscience researchers in sensorimotor learning (Herzfeld et al., 2014). In
our sensorimotor learning, reward of motor commands is maintained inside an agent as the
judgment provided by the agent‘s mind. In contrast, those neuroscience researchers assume that
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the movement of motor commands occurs outside of the agent as the feedback ―provided‖ by the
environment. We consider the reward and the movement to be the two indicators for the
evaluation of a motor command. We note that both of them are used to indicate aspects of motor
commands, and it seems they also have some similar principles, such as the way to update their
indications of motor commands—they both use a type of learning rate to weight the updating of
the old knowledge of the motor command by the new. Thus, we have integrated the idea of
memory of errors from Herzfeld and colleagues (2014) into our work for updating the reward of
motor commands. We consider this a kind of indirect biological inspiration for our approach.
Next we provide the way in which memory of errors dynamically controls the value of
the parameter β. (This parameter β is a similar concept to that of the learning rate η previously
introduced, both of them are inspired by the concept of memory of errors (Herzfeld et al., 2014);
but their computational implementations are slightly different.)
First, a (reward) error is classified as either positive or negative, depending on the sign of
subtracting the old (stored) reward from the new reward. Then when our agent has performed its
task (pushing a box) for a while, having experienced a sequence of errors, the type of these errors
may switch differently, switching from slowly to rapidly; here we mean switching between
positive and negative reward errors, and the switches occurs either frequently (i.e. "rapidly") or
sporadically (i.e. "slowly"). Therefore, we have different types of memory of errors from the
viewpoint of their stability, based on the rate of switching. We represent the number of errors the
agent has experienced by a variable n, and the number of switches between these errors by a
variable s. These variables are integers starting from zero. Based on these two variables, we
represent the status of the memory of errors by a variable t as expressed by Eq. (21), and then
calculate the value of β using a sigmoid function assisted by the variable t as expressed by Eq.
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(22). The parameter θ tunes the effect of t, and is set to 1.0 by default. β ranges from 0.0 to 1.0
with a default value of 0.5.
t=n–2*s

(21)
(22)

Here we illustrate the behavior of β with examples. If the agent has experienced many
errors that rarely switch, the value of n is large and the value of s is small; therefore, the value of
t and therefore θt are large; so β is close to 1.0. This means that a slowly switching environment
results in a high learning rate. On the other hand, if there are errors in memory but they have
switched signs very often, the values of both s and n are large, so t is negative with a large
absolute value; thus the value of β is close to 0.0. This means a rapidly switching environment
leads to a low learning rate. These simulated behaviors qualitatively agree with the hypothesis
proposed by Herzfeld et al.(2014). Note that when there is no error in the memory yet, the value
of t is 0 because n and s are 0, so the value of β is 0.5, which is the same as the default value of β.
Finally, we add error databases to store the history of variables n and variable s. These
databases are maintained in the SMM as shown in Figure 22. They interact with reward
processes to (1) update memory of errors based on the arrival of new errors, and (2) provide
current error‘s history to dynamically control the value of β.
Experimental Results
This section describes an experimental study to evaluate this modeled sensorimotor
learning and its dynamic learning rate. Figure 23 shows a bird‘s eye view of the experimental
environment and the agent in their initial configuration. The agent stands in a field containing
three movable boxes. They are surrounded by walls, a kind of obstacle that cannot be moved.
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Figure 23: A bird‘s eye view of the experimental environment and the agent
We are interested in the following questions: 1) How well will the action of pushing a
box be executed with sensorimotor learning; and 2) What is the effect of implementing the
dynamic learning rate into the learning?
We evaluate the performance of the box pushing using two criteria: 1) the average value
of the reward obtained so far by the pusher FSM (see Figure 22) inside the agent—we consider
pushing to be the core part of the box pushing task—and 2) the distance that the boxes have been
moved in the environment.
We compare the box pushing performance across six different agent conditions: 1)
randomly chosen motor commands; 2) handcoded motor commands; 3-5) sensorimotor learning
with constant learning rates of 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9 respectively; and 6) learning with a dynamic
learning rate. Under the handcoded condition, the expected ―best‖ commands are chosen when
the agent is in certain given states: the finder module chooses forward motion if an object has
been detected to be near the front; the pusher chooses forward if a bump event is detected; and
the unwedger module randomly chooses a command to turn left or right if the agent is stuck. In
other states, commands are randomly chosen.
In each condition, we perform 10 consecutive trials. A new trial begins from the initial
configuration of the environment and the agent, but the rewards of the motor commands and the
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reward errors are remembered throughout the trials. During each trial the agent runs 500
simulation steps, so under each condition, the agent runs 5000 steps. In our case, each step is
simulated with 50 virtual time units—the agent executes at unit intervals in Webots‘ virtual time.
We collected the first criterion of average value of the reward every 50 steps of the
agent‘s run, so 100 average values were collected during the total of 5000 steps. Figure 24 plots
the average values under the six conditions. The plotted curves illustrate that 1) with
sensorimotor learning added, the pusher module obtains more rewards than the random agent
does, 2) the pusher obtains the most rewards under the dynamic learning rate condition (except
during the initial steps), and 3) the handcoded agent outperforms the agents with the three
constant learning rates.
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Figure 24: The average values of rewards obtained by the pusher over 5000 steps. The
vertical axis represents the sum of all rewards obtained by the pusher divided by the
number of steps the agent has run so far, and the horizontal axis represents the
completed proportion of the 5000 steps. For learning vs. random, p < 10-5; for dynamic
vs. hand-coded, p < 10-7; for hand-coded vs. constant learning rates, p < 10-11.
Regarding the second criterion, the sums of the distances that the boxes have been moved
during 10 trials under each of the six conditions are displayed in Table 3. These show that 1) the
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agents with sensorimotor learning at the three constant rates have pushed the boxes farther than
the random agent, 2) using the dynamic learning rate yields the greatest box pushing distance,
and 3) the handcoded agent yields the second greatest distance.
Table 3: The sums of the distances that the boxes have
been moved during 10 trials
Learning Rate

Distance
(m)
Dynamic
1.6002
Handcoded
1.2023
Constant (0.5) 0.9521
Constant (0.9) 0.6357
Constant (0.1) 0.3223
Random
0.2338

The results reported above support the assertion that sensorimotor learning improves the
performance of box pushing to a certain extent, and that adding the dynamic learning rate clearly
increases that extent. This increased improvement supports that memory of errors—the agent‘s
knowledge of the environment‘s stability—helps the agent interact with its environment more
effectively.
On the other hand, we think more evidence is needed to support the causality between
using a dynamic learning rate and the learning performance. Our motivation for modeling this
dynamic learning rate is the replication of some recently proposed hypotheses from neuroscience
regarding the effect of memory of errors (Herzfeld et al., 2014). In brief, the hypotheses suggest
that a dynamic learning rate helps an agent achieve a better adaptation to its environment based
on its memory of errors, but can that adaptation always be translated into improved
performance? We leave this as an issue for future work.
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We did not compare our results with the results obtained by Mahadevan and Connell
(1992) because they have different experimental motivations, and thus a different types of
results. They are interested in determining 1) the effect of decomposing the overall task into a set
of subsumption modules for learning, and 2) the performances of different learning algorithms,
while we are interested in the biologically inspired implementation of sensorimotor learning, and
adding a learning rate control mechanism inspired by the idea of memory of errors (Herzfeld et
al., 2014).
Conclusions
In this chapter, we implemented sensorimotor learning in LIDA (Franklin et al., 2014).
This implementation follows the ideas of Global Workspace Theory, and uses reinforcement
learning. Furthermore, we added a dynamic learning rate into the learning, which is controlled by
a history of errors. Actually the approach to a variable learning rate has been explored before,
such as the principle of ―Win or Learn Fast‖ (WoFL) (Bowling & Veloso, 2001), while in our
work the design distinctly relates to recent results on error memory from neuroscience. Our
preliminary experimental results suggest that sensorimotor learning using a dynamic learning
rate improves the performance of action execution: the generated motor commands are more
effective. But as we have mentioned above, we think this conclusion needs more supporting
evidence.
One major limitation in the current project is that the motor commands of the robot are
very simple and the execution of each of these commands typically can be done within one step
of the agent‘s run. That means the agent can predict the execution result of a motor command
very well—its predicted result will very often be approximately the same as the sensory result.
Under this condition, it is hard to model, and so then study, the motor command error, the
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difference between the predicted and the sensory result. We plan to apply the currently
implemented LIDA-based controller to another robot that provides more complicated motor
commands, which we expect, will produce more obvious (larger) motor errors.
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7. Modeling Motor Priming in LIDA
Introduction
In the field of science, we propose a hypothesis about our study target, one particular
aspect of the world, and then constantly refine the hypothesis. Basically, a hypothesis is refined
based on the observations of our study target and the relevant inferences from them. We design
and perform experiments about the study target, so as to observe it more deeply and broadly.
In a study of human movement (T. Schmidt, 2002), the author reported that the
participants‘ movements were affected by earlier sensory data, suggesting that priming occurs in
motor control. However, our current SMS can neither explain nor replicate the priming effect
Schmidt reported, so we improved the LIDA Model by extending its SMS to model motor
priming in LIDA.
The next section introduces the details of the priming experiment with humans.
Following that, I introduce our design of the extended SMS. And then the simulated finger
movement is introduced. Finally I give the summary, the limitation, and the future work of the
model of the extended SMS.
Previous work
In psychology, priming refers to an effect in which exposure to one stimulus influences
the response to a later stimulus. For example, if a person sees a picture of a fish and soon
thereafter reads the word ―bank‖, then he is more likely to interpret the word as the bank a river,
as opposed to a financial institution. In general, priming can affect task decisions people make,
for object identification, motor control, and many others.
This experiment (T. Schmidt, 2002) was designed to measure priming effects for human
movement. Participants were required to view a white dot in the center of a dark background
screen, and put their right index finger on the dot. Then, they were asked to respond to the
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appearance of a target with a pre-specified color (red) by moving the right index finger onto the
target. In detail, an experimental trial consisted of four phases: fixation, primes, blank, and
masks (See Figure 25). In the fixation phase, a white stimulus, the fixation point, was shown in
the center of the screen, and the participant was required to initiate the experiment by placing his
right index finger there. The fixation point remained on the screen throughout all four phases.
During the primes phase (10 ms in length), two disk stimuli (one red and one green), the
primes, were shown in opposite quadrants of the display, on a rising diagonal (see Figure 25).
Then the blank phase began, consisting of a specified delay from 0 to 50 ms at 10 ms intervals,
during which the primes disappeared, leaving only the dark background and the fixation point.
Finally in the masks phase, two annular stimuli (one red and one green), the masks, were shown
at the same positions as the primes; they remained on the screen until the participant‘s finger
reached the target. Mask colors were either switched (inconsistent) with respect to prime colors
or not switched (consistent).
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green
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Fixation
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Figure 25: Four phases in the priming experiment
The participants‘ finger movement trajectories were recorded and analyzed (T. Schmidt,
2002). When primes and masks were consistent, the finger moved directly toward the target (red)
mask stimulus. However, when primes and masks were inconsistent, the movement initially
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started in the direction of the non-target (green) mask stimulus but then was corrected and moved
to the target (red) one.
Schmidt explained why the ―wrong‖ finger movement was observed in the above
inconsistent situation, where the participants first moved toward the non-target mask stimulus,
though the goal was moving to the target one (2002). He hypothesized that the previously
perceived sensory data, the target (red) prime, affects the later movement in the masks phase.
Since in the inconsistent situation, the target (red) prime stimulus and the non-target (green)
mask stimulus were displayed at the same locations, participants were affected to move toward
the non-target (green) mask stimulus in the beginning of the masks phase. This is a typical
priming effect occurring in motor control that we would like to replicate.
Furthermore, Schmidt found that in the inconsistent situation, the magnitude of the
priming effect, that ―wrong‖ direction moving, increases with the stimulus onset asynchrony
(SOA) of prime and mask (2002). SOA refers to the time between the primes onset and the
masks onset. Since the blank phase is specified between 0 ~ 50 ms, SOA is between 10 ~ 60 ms.
The average finger movement trajectories are shown in Figure 261. Regarding the inconsistent
trajectories, their maximum amplitude represents the magnitude of the priming effect, which
increases with the SOA. This is another important feature of the priming effect that we wish to
replicate.
In Figure 26, each movement trajectory average is calculated based on about 1,000 trials.
The movement is considered to have arrived when the distance to target is shorter than 10 mm.
More details of the experiment can be consulted in its original report (T. Schmidt, 2002).

1

Figure 26 is reused from (T. Schmidt, 2002) with permission.
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This is the figure taken from Schmidt, T. (2002). The finger in flight: Real-time motor
control by visually masked color stimuli. Psychological Science, 13(2), 112-118.
Figure 26: Time course of the euclidean distance between finger and target (red) mask during
the finger movements. Trajectories are aligned on prime onset to show that the early phases
of the movements were similar in all conditions. Vertical lines indicate onsets of primes
(solid) and masks (dotted). Standard errors (between trials) at the sample times of maximum
amplitude and arrival are shown. SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony of prime and mask.
The experimental results reported above (T. Schmidt, 2002) have been cited in the study
of visual priming (F. Schmidt, Weber, & Schmidt, 2014; Tafazoli, Di Filippo, & Zoccolan,
2012), unconscious responses to primes (Deplancke, Madelain, Gorea, & Coello, 2013), and the
channel for non-conscious vision (Breitmeyer, 2014). In addition, the further studies have
pursued in different directions, including the studies of two sequential primes (Grainger,
Scharnowski, Schmidt, & Herzog, 2013) and different stimuli (chromatic vs. achromatic stimuli)
used in updating target location (Kane, Wade, & Ma-Wyatt, 2011).
The design of the extended SMS
In the design of the original SMS, sensory data perceived before the start action, the
prime, would not have been involved in the process of action execution. Thus the priming effect
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occurring in motor control had not been modeled. Here we extended the design of the SMS so as
to bring the effect of earlier sensory data into action execution.
Failure to simulate the priming effect using the original Sensory Motor System (SMS)
As described above, the participants‘ movements were affected by their earlier sensed
data. That means that priming occurs in motor control. However, the original SMS can neither
explain nor replicate that priming effect, Schmidt observed. In the experiment (T. Schmidt,
2002), the earlier sensory data affects the motor control; specifically it differently affects motor
control in the consistent vs. the inconsistent conditions.
Using a LIDA-based agent equipped with the original SMS, we simulated the earlier
sensory data influencing a finger pointing movement as described in the human experiment (T.
Schmidt, 2002). We simulated the finger movement in three situations: under (1) consistent and
(2) inconsistent conditions, and (3) a ―control‖ situation where the earlier sensory data had not
been applied. We found that among the three conditions, the trajectories of the finger movements
were all the same, meaning that the agent using the original SMS did not successfully simulate
the priming effect.
Conceptually speaking, in the original SMS, if we consider the time that a motor plan
starts to run the present, then we would have (1) the current sensory data for specification—the
specification process makes a motor plan ready and starts it running—and (2) the future sensory
data for an update, which occurs after the motor plan starts to run. However, the earlier sensory
data, the data perceived before the motor plan starts to run, has not yet been considered, so it
does not contribute to action execution in the original SMS. Therefore, applying different earlier
sensory data, simulating both the inconsistent and consistent situations, or even not applying
earlier sensory data, will not produce any difference.
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The extended Sensory Motor System (SMS)
We need to extend LIDA‘s SMS to give it the capability of correctly handling the motor
priming process. In the relevant situation here, the priming process begins with the instructions
given by the experimenter to the participants in the experiment (T. Schmidt, 2002). These
instructions would result in an expectation on the part of a participant of impending finger
movement, either up and to the right or down and to the left. According to the LIDA Model with
the extended SMS, when the participant‘s finger was placed on the centered white dot, this
expectation would lead to the selection of two motor plan templates (MPTs), one for the up and
to the right finger movement and the other for the down and to the left. These MPTs will be
awaiting an expected target in one location each. This is the context in which we extended
LIDA‘s SMS.
In the extended SMS, compared to the original as shown in Figure 16, we did not change
the functions of the original processes, motor plan template (MPT) selection, specification, nor
online control.
We added the use of earlier sensory data in action execution. In the original SMS, the
motor plan is only created after the initiation of action execution triggered by the arrival of a
selected behavior. In the extended version, the expectation of a target, together with earlier
sensory data, can help the agent to prepare motor plans before the movement starts, and then
those motor plans can be running during the movement. This use of the earlier sensory data
resembles a priming process that can occur in motor control. See details about this newly added
priming process.
Furthermore, in the original SMS, the time at which a motor plan begins to run is not
explicitly defined. It was implicitly assumed that when a motor plan is ready, it immediately
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starts to run. But is it true that there is no gap between a motor plan‘s ready time and its start
time? If being ready is not sufficient, what other triggers or reasons are there for a motor plan to
run? We discuss this next.
Finally, we discuss the cooperation of multiple motor plans, and give descriptions of how
this extended SMS is used in LIDA to replicate such priming effects as are reported in the human
experiment (T. Schmidt, 2002).
The priming process and a tension variable
We define the priming process extending SMS as a process in which the earlier sensory
data assists in the preparation of a motor plan that affects an action execution process that starts
later.
To model a priming process, we extended LIDA‘s SMS to include a system that allows
certain sensory data to associate to a MPT that is chosen due to the presence of an expectation of
an impending movement. When the MPT has been chosen, in other words, when its activation
becomes relatively high but not high enough to be selected yet, then the arrival of the required
sensory data may help to select this MPT, and then specify it to a ready motor plan.
One important aspect of priming is the way in which the prepared motor plan affects the
upcoming action execution. To simulate this effect in a quantitative way, we added a new feature
to the motor plan, represented by a floating point variable, tension. From a conceptual viewpoint,
the value of the tension in a motor plan represents the motor plan‘s potential power, how strong
the motor commands generated by this motor plan will be. For example, with respect to a motor
plan generating motor commands that control the index finger moving to a target location, higher
tension in the motor plan will yield motor commands to be applied to the finger with stronger
force.

142

A motor plan‘s tension will have different values depending on the situations. First, when
a motor plan is initially created (prepared), the tension value is set to 0 by default. Second, if a
motor plan does not run immediately after it has been created, then its tension will increase. The
motor plan accumulates its ―desire to run‖ by adding to the value of tension. On the other hand,
when a motor plan starts to run, its tension decreases. The motor plan releases its tension when
its ―desire to run‖ is satisfied.
We designed the tension to change quickly, whether increasing or decreasing. That means
its value is time sensitive. Even at an interval of 1 ms, change in tension is still observable.
Based on this design, a motor plan‘s tension increases quickly before the motor plan starts to run,
decreasing as quickly afterward.
In the extended SMS, the motor plan may be created (prepared) via the priming process
before the arrival of the selected behavior. In this case, that motor plan has to wait to run until
the arrival of a selected behavior. The value of a motor plan‘s tension is a function of this
waiting time. Different motor plans might have different tensions at a moment if they have
waited over different times.
The starting of a motor plan
In the extended Sensory Motor System (SMS), because of the expectation and the earlier
sensory data, a motor plan may be created before action execution starts; in other words, the
motor plan does not always start to run immediately after its creation. The arrival of a selected
behavior acts as a trigger that starts the motor plans to run.
Furthermore, the selected behavior may provide a specified power to its associated motor
plan so that the following generated motor commands will have a specified value of the force
applied to the actuators. Note that both the selected behavior and the motor plan‘s tension may
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give the relevant motor commands some amount of force. On the other hand, when a selected
behavior arrives, the force contributed by the behavior will last throughout the movement, while
the force given by the tension will die away very quickly since the tension‘s value decreases
quickly when a motor plan starts to run.
Cooperation among multiple motor plans
If there are multiple motor plans ready when the selected behavior arrives, all of the
motor plans will begin to run, generating their motor commands. However, depending on the
tension value of a motor plan and whether the selected behavior associates to it, the motor
commands generated may have different values of their forces.
If the motor commands generated by different motor plans are applied to the same
actuator, for example a finger, then the total force applied from the different commands will be
combined together. The command with larger force will have greater control over the actuator.
By using this extended SMS in LIDA, we can explain and replicate the priming effects
reported in the human experiment (T. Schmidt, 2002).
We can replicate the ―wrong‖ finger movement in the inconsistent situation as described
above. In the primes phase, the perceived sensory data, the target (red) prime, triggers the
preparation of a motor plan generating motor commands for moving to the target prime location.
When this motor plan is prepared (created), its tension begins to increase quickly. Later, in the
masks phase, another target (red) mask appears. It triggers the preparation of another motor plan
as well, that generates motor commands for moving to the target mask location. This second
motor plan‘s tension also quickly begins to increase. Since the motor plan moving to the target
prime was created earlier than the motor plan moving to the target mask, the former motor plan
will have larger tension than the later one.
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When the two motor plans start to run, they generate motor commands moving to their
own specified target locations. In the inconsistent situation, the targets (red) set in the primes and
the masks phases are in the opposite location, and so the relevant motor commands are trying to
move the finger in opposite directions. Because the earlier (prime) motor plan has accumulated
its tension for longer than the later (mask) motor plan, the motor commands moving to the target
prime will have stronger force, resulting in the finger initially moving towards to the target prime
(wrong) location.
Then after a short while, both motor plans‘ tension disappear, so that the motor command
force given by the tensions drops to zero. But the motor plan associated with the selected
behavior is given a specified power, and so it generates motor commands with specified force
lasting during the movement. In the context of the LIDA Model, the selected behavior is
recruited by the sensory data of the target mask filtered through the understanding and attention
phases, so the motor commands moving to the mask target have a constant specified force. The
end result is that motor commands moving to the target prime lose all of their force, while the
commands to the target mask still have some amount of force, so the finger is corrected to move
to the mask target (correct) location during the masks phase.
We can also replicate the phenomenon of the magnitude of the priming effect increasing
with the length of the blank phase. As shown in Figure 26, in the inconsistent situation, longer
SOA gives more wrong direction movement. In our extended SMS within LIDA, a longer blank
phase gives the prepared (prime) motor plan more time to accumulate its tension, and more
tension causes more force assigned to the motor commands moving to the target prime (wrong)
location. This results in more wrong direction movement.
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Simulation experiments
We prepared a simulation of the environment reported in the human experiment (T.
Schmidt, 2002). Following that, we created a LIDA-based agent using the LIDA Framework
with some customized configurations, including an implementation of our extended sensory
motor system (SMS). We ran an experiment to replicate the priming effect reported in the human
experiment.
The setup of the simulation
Using graphic libraries provided by Java2, we simulated the dark background pictures to
make a four-phase environment (see Figure 27). We prepared different pictures for the primes
phase so simulating both consistent and inconsistent situations. Besides the middle white dot, red
and green disk, and annular stimuli, we added a yellow rectangle to represent the simulated
finger‘s current location during the movement. We programmed the four phases presented in the
same order and durations as in the human experiment.

Inconsistent
case

Consistent
case

Fixation

Primes

Blank

Masks

Figure 27. The simulated environment
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Simulation time was measured in ticks, an artificial time unit created in the LIDA
Framework (Snaider et al., 2011). One tick represents one millisecond of experimental time.
We configured things such that (1) the duration of the blank phase could be specified
from 0 to 50 ticks with 10 ticks as interval, and (2) the environment could be specified as either
inconsistent or consistent. So there were 12 types of environmental configurations in total.
Also, we have developed a program (the driver) to control the position of the yellow
rectangle, representing the movement of the finger, to which the agent could send the motor
commands. Two types of the forces are supposed to be applied to this finger. Each of these
forces controls the finger moving towards one of the two possible target locations, either top
right or lower left.
Replicating the priming effect using the extended SMS in LIDA
Method
Using a LIDA-based agent including the extended SMS, we ran the finger movement
under each of the 12 environmental configurations. For each type of environment, we ran the
finger movement for 1,000 trials. Participants have done a similar amount of trials in the human
experiment (T. Schmidt, 2002) as well.
We calculated the distance between the simulated finger location and the target location
over time during the movement for every trial. So we had collected 12,000 movement
trajectories over time for the 12 environmental configurations.
Because the modules implemented in the LIDA Model are asynchronous, our LIDAbased agent‘s moving behaviors are not 100% deterministic in the view of time and space
(Franklin et al., 2016). Thus the collected trajectories may differ among every 1,000 trials, and
especially the running time of the 1,000 trials are not always the same. We did a pre-process to
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clean up the collected raw data. For every 1,000 trials we discarded a few of them if their
running times are too far away from the mean (> 1 std) of the 1,000 trials. Table 4 shows exactly
how many trials we used from each 1,000 for the analysis. Totally we used 11,627 trials in our
analysis and it is about 96.9% of the entire raw data. Schmidt performed a similar pre-process in
the human experiment (1.86% of the total trials were discarded).

Table 4. The cleaned trials for the replication
Blank 0
ticks
Consistent
988
Inconsistent
945

Blank 10
ticks
991
933

Blank 20
ticks
970
955

Blank 30
ticks
967
964

Blank 40
ticks
992
975

Blank 50
ticks
989
958

Results
In the simulation‘s masks phase, when using the consistent environmental configurations,
the simulated finger directly moves to the target (red) location, while when using the inconsistent
configurations, the finger initially moved towards the wrong location and then changed to the
target location. This is qualitatively the same as the results reported from the human experiment
(2002).
As shown in Figure 28 (x-dim: time and y-dim: distance), we plotted the average
trajectories based on the above cleaned simulated data. This result qualitatively resembles
movement trajectories of the human participants, as shown in Figure 26. The simulated
trajectories are in two groups, consistent and inconsistent parts. For the inconsistent part, the
trajectories have maximum amplitude indicating the movement correction moments; also, the
longer blank duration makes the movement initially further towards the wrong direction (the
magnitude of the priming effect increasing with the blank durations).
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35
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25
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15
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5
0

0

100
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300
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Figure 28. The distance between the simulated finger and the target location over time
during the movement. Trajectories are aligned on prime onset and drawn on mask
onset. Dotted vertical lines indicate the various onsets of masks.
We calculated standard deviations at the times of maximum amplitude and arrival for the
trajectories of the inconsistent part as shown in Table 5. These deviations have also been
reported by Schmidt (T. Schmidt, 2002). Our results are comparable to his.

Table 5. The standard deviations at the times of maximum amplitude and
arrival for the trajectories of the inconsistent part

Max Amp
Arrival

Blank 0
ticks
0.3183
1.0077

Blank 10
ticks
0.50359
1.1855

Blank 20
ticks
1.5397
1.6722

Blank 30
ticks
1.7098
0.8926

Blank 40
ticks
2.0049
0.91699

Blank 50
ticks
2.3702
1.0466

In the experimental results with humans, the maximal finger moving speeds are very
similar: the maximal slopes of the all trajectories shown in the Figure 26 are very close. For each
of our simulated movements, we limited the same maximal total force that could be applied on
the finger. This setting indirectly sets a maximal speed the finger could move during the
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movement. So in our simulation, a finger will reach a maximal speed after the initial part and
before the final arrival part (see Figure 28).
Furthermore, the trajectories‘ slopes shown in Figure 26 are slightly different; especially
the inconsistent trajectories have higher slope than the consistent trajectories. We think that is
because the participants were instructed to move their fingers as soon as possible, so a participant
would correct his or her movement with higher maximal speed when the finger was moving
further towards to the wrong direction. We simulated this feature by dynamically tuning the
maximal speed set to a movement: in the inconsistent case, longer blank duration will have a
little bit higher maximal speed set. The result shown in Figure 28 included this small difference.
Borrowed from the human experiment, we also simulated a so called arrival period (the
distance <= 10 mm). From Figure 26, we found that in this period, the decreasing slopes of the
trajectories were not fixed and that they dynamically slowed down. To simulate this feature, we
simply used a linear function to decrease the changing rate over time. This implementation is not
biologically inspired but just an engineering simulation. Since this feature of the changing rate is
not one of our major research interests, it is fine to mimic the trajectories occurring in the arrival
period using an engineering simulation.
In Figure 26, among the all trajectories, their starting parts are slightly different in the y
dimension. Schmidt (2002) did not discuss this difference. We think it could be because that in
the beginning of the movement, the participants did not put their fingers on the exactly the same
point on the screen but within a very small area around the initial white dot. Since this difference
was not discussed in the original paper (2002) and was not among the major phenomena we
planned to study, we did not simulate that.

150

Conclusion
Summary
The LIDA systems level cognitive model attempt to model minds. This should include
modeling priming, including motor priming, so as to explain and predict motor priming
phenomena. We have updated the LIDA Model so as to be able to computationally replicate an
unconscious priming effect on motor control as reported from a human experiment (T. Schmidt,
2002). In order to successfully carry out this replication, we had to extend the sensory motor
system (SMS) of the LIDA cognitive model including introducing the notion of tension.
We have created a LIDA-based agent including the extended SMS. In order to simulate
the priming effect, we needed to introduce a variable, tension, in the extended SMS. The value of
this tension variable influences the extent of the priming effect among the different
configurations of the experimental environments. With these extensions to its SMS, the LIDA
Model was able to successfully explain and predict the results of Schmidt‘s experiment,
something it could not do without them.
Limitation and future work
In the experimental results with humans as reported in Figure 26, the all finger
movements start at close to the same time. But in our simulated result as shown in Figure 28, the
movements start at distinctly different moments. In our simulation, if the mask stimulus, the
consciously reportable one, arrives later, then the finger movement starts later. This is because in
our simulation, the timing of the conscious process has not been affected by the priming, so that
it has a fixed duration. But in the human experimental results (Figure 26), the target mask onset
varies among different experimental conditions, but the movements start at close to the same
time. Based on this, we assume that the priming, in the context of the experimental instructions
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given to the participants, affects the following conscious process so as to somehow make the
conscious process have a dynamic duration dependent on the time period between the prime and
the target mask onset.
This discussion about the effect of the priming on the following conscious process is
outside of the scope of our current study, where we study the priming effect on motor control
(unconsciously). We plan to continue studying this issue in the future.
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8. Contributions
Action execution plays a critical role in the modeling of human level agents. It allows the
agent to actually act in the environment for particular goals (agendas), over time to affect what it
senses in future (Franklin & Graesser, 1997). As introduced in Chapter 1, low-level
environmental information is needed for action execution, although that information may not be
understandable. Based on the hypothesis of two visual systems (Goodale & Milner, 1992; Milner
& Goodale, 2008), the low-level environmental information may pass directly from the agent‘s
sensory memory to its motor control mechanism, e.g., the SMS in LIDA. Furthermore, action
execution is not a simple reflex in response to a stimulus; it is driven by the agent‘s goals, and
transformed by the agent‘s goal-directed action selection. A neuroscience hypothesis states that
the agent‘s covert desires are supposed to be taken over by an overt action execution mechanism
(Jeannerod, 2006). In this way, action execution implements one aspect of action, ―how to do it‖,
which naturally connects to another aspect, ―what to do‖.
We have reviewed a set of (systems level) cognitive architectures in Chapter 3, especially
with regards to action execution. The generic characteristics of action execution for cognitive
architectures have been discussed here. Also, we found that prior to the present work, none of
these architectures implement the aspect of ―how to do it‖ fully. For example, ACT-R typically
does not have a channel that directly links sensory memory to the motor control. And in Soar, the
output motor commands are not executable in the environment; another domain-dependent
program is always necessary to execute the commands.
Therefore, we have created the Sensory Motor System (SMS) for LIDA, to implement
how an action is executed in LIDA. This work has been introduced in Chapter 4. As the core of
the SMS, we have adopted the subsumption architecture, which generates executable motor
commands driven by the arrival of sensory data. Also, we have enhanced the original
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subsumption architecture by (1) adding variables to manipulate motor command values
dynamically and (2) connecting a goal-directed action, the selected behavior in LIDA, to this
architecture, so as to combine its reactive structure with a systems level cognitive architecture.
A computational SMS has been implemented for the execution of a grip behavior, and its
simulated results have been compared to human data. This biologically inspired design, together
with a computational verification by the comparison of model and human behaviors, supports the
SMS as a qualitatively reasonable cognitive model for action execution.
We have modeled estimation in action execution, as introduced in Chapter 5,adding a
computational model of the sensorimotor integration process (Wolpert et al., 1995) into the SMS.
Wolpert and colleagues have provided the experimental results of human hand movement studies
to support this model (1995). We replicated these results using a LIDA-based agent embedded
with the SMS having the estimation process implemented. Furthermore, we have extended this
sensorimotor integration process by using memory of errors (Herzfeld et al., 2014), enabling our
model to replicate more features of human movement estimation.
Learning in LIDA, inspired by Global Workspace Theory (GWT) (Baars, 1988, 2002), is
instigated by the broadcasting of the contents of consciousness to the rest of system during each
cognitive cycle; this conscious content cues the update of relevant data stored in the various
long-term memories. We have implemented an additional kind of learning in LIDA,
sensorimotor learning, which follows the ideas of GWT, and uses reinforcement learning. It
allows a dynamical selection of the motor commands at runtime based on the newly experienced
rewards of the commands. Also, we have added a dynamic learning rate for this learning, which
is controlled by a history of errors. This sensorimotor learning is introduced in Chapter 6.

154

Finally as shown in Chapter 7, I have further extended the SMS by adding a model of
how earlier sensory data affects the current movement, as inspired by human experiments (T.
Schmidt, 2002) studying the priming process occurring in motor control.

I list a contribution table below (Table 6), of Contributions and citations to their
published descriptions.
Table 6. Contributions and citations to their published references
No

Contributions

1

A review of action execution
(Ch. 3)

2

The development of the Sensory
Motor System (SMS) for LIDA
(Ch. 4)

3

The extension of the
subsumption architecture (Ch. 4)

4

A LIDA-based agent to execute
a grip action (Ch. 4)

5

Adding an internal model into
the SMS (Ch. 5)

6

The extension of the internal
model with the concept of
memory of errors (Ch. 5)

7

Adding sensorimotor learning
into the SMS (Ch. 6)

8

A dynamic learning rate for the
sensorimotor learning (Ch. 6)

9

An extension of the SMS for
modeling motor priming in
LIDA (Ch. 7)

References
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Execution Process Implemented in Different
Cognitive Architectures: A Review. Journal of
Artificial General Intelligence, 5(1), 47-66.
Dong, D., & Franklin, S. (2014b). Sensory Motor
System: Modeling the process of action execution.
Paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 36th Annual
Conference of the Cognitive Science Society,
Quebec, Canada, 2145-2150.
Dong, D., & Franklin, S. (2015). A New Action
Execution Module for the Learning Intelligent
Distribution Agent (LIDA): The Sensory Motor
System. Cognitive Computation, 7(5), 552-568.

Dong, D., Franklin, S., & Agrawal, P. (2015).
Estimating Human Movements Using Memory of
Errors. Procedia Computer Science, 71, 1-10.

Dong, D., & Franklin, S. (2015). Modeling
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Learning Rate. Biologically Inspired Cognitive
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Limitations and Future Work
As introduced in Chapter 5, we have modeled an estimation process in action execution,
implemented by adding a sensorimotor integration process into the Sensory Motor System
(SMS). In this model, the efference copy hypothesis (Jeannerod, 2006; Von Holst & Mittelstaedt,
1950) suggests that people use the difference between real and estimated sensory data to
distinguish self-produced changes from externally produced ones. But this purpose, a single SMS
is definitely not adequate. We need other module(s) responding to the difference sent out from
the SMS to build up new understandings, such as the knowledge of ―self‖ vs. ―non-self‖. One
direction for future work is to explore further towards manipulation of other cognitive modules
to model the human capability of distinguishing self-produced changes from externally produced
changes.
As introduced in Chapter 6, we have implemented sensorimotor learning in LIDA, and
we have added a dynamic learning rate into the learning. Also, we have built this learning into a
LIDA-based agent to examine how it affects the agent‘s capability of pushing, a particular type
of action execution. But one major limitation for this experiment is that the motor commands of
the agent are very simple, and the execution of each of these commands typically can be done
within one step of the agent‘s run. This entails that the agent can predict the execution result of a
motor command very well—its predicted result will very often be approximately the same as the
sensory result. Under this condition, it is hard to model for study the motor command error, the
difference between the predicted and the sensory result. Thus another direction for future work is
application of the currently implemented LIDA-based controller to another robot that provides
more complicated motor commands, which we expect will produce larger motor errors that allow
better examination of our model.
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Appendix A
Table 7. Three types of Herbert’s arm controller components and their simulated
pseudo codes
Name

1. Module

Design diagram

Pseudo code (Java)

FSMImpl extends FrameworkTask{
①
receiveData (Input){ … };
runThisFrameworkTask(){
execute();
}

②

execute(){ … switch (state) {…}};
Cmd output(){ … };

③

}

2. Suppress
node

suppress extends FrameworkTask{
① inputLowerLayer(LowerInput)
{ … };
②

③

④

inputHigherLayer(HigherInput)
{ … };
runThisFrameworkTask(){
if (HigherInput != Null)
Cmd = HigherInput;
else
Cmd = LowerInput;
}
Cmd output() { … };

}
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Table 7. Three types of Herbert’s arm controller components and their simulated
pseudo codes
Name

Design diagram

Pseudo code (Java)

W1

wire1 extends FrameworkTask{
runThisFrameworkTask(){
S .inputLowerLayer(M1.output));
}
}

W2

wire2 extends FrameworkTask{
runThisFrameworkTask(){
S .inputHigherLayer(M2.output));
}
}

W3

wire3 extends FrameworkTask{
runThisFrameworkTask(){
commands = S .output;
}
}

3. Wire

Appendix B
The software architecture for the simulated Herbert arm controller is shown in Figure 29.
The module component, depicted on the right, originates from a LIDA Framework interface
(FrameworkTask), and starts from an interface FSM that indicates common features of the
module. An abstract class FSMImpl implements FSM and extends a LIDA Framework abstract
class (FrameworkTaskImpl) to achieve the methods common to the modules, such as I/O and the
task run. The interface ArmsFSM extends FSM to claim specific methods for arm modules, such
as receiving the arm‘s position and moving the hand, and which are implemented in the abstract
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class ArmsFSMImpl. Three hand modules (GrabFSM, OpenFSM, and DepositFSM) extend
FSMImpl to implement their own agendas. Another twelve arm modules extend ArmsFSMPlmpl
for different arm tasks, ExtendFSM, SurfaceFSM, and others as indicated in Figure 11.
On the top left of Figure 29 is a MPT interface representing a general Motor Plan
Template (MPT). An abstract class SubsumptionMPT implements the interface to claim a type of
MPT that is inspired by the principles of the subsumption architecture. SubsumptionMPT
contains two types of inner classes that extend FrameworkTaskImpl, suppress and wires.
Suppress simulates the suppress node used as a component of the simulated controller, and five
wire classes simulate five types of wire component: wiring from a module or a suppress node to
a suppress node‘s higher or lower input (four types), or from a suppress node to the final output
(the fifth type).
A GripMPT class extends SubsumptionMPT to implement a specific MPT for a grip. It
structures all three types of components shown in Figure 10—module (FSM and ArmsFSM),
suppress, and wire—and provides methods for I/O and running components.
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Figure 29. The software architecture for the simulated Herbert arm controller
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